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**'FORGETFULNESS AND WORLD IN HUSSERL AND HEIDEGGER'**

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**CANDIDATE NO:** 160310

**SUPERVISOR:** Prof Tanja Staehler

UNIVERSITY OF SUSSEX  
M.A., DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY, SCHOOL OF HISTORY, ART  
HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY  
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## ABSTRACT

This dissertation deals with the ways in which Husserl and Heidegger constitute the relationship between forgetfulness and world. I will examine the Cartesian view of the world as a ground to analyse the structure of forgetfulness in both. Therefore, I will respectively expound their accounts, and focus on how they break with the Cartesian tradition and overcome forgetfulness. I will contest Heidegger's claim that Husserl remains in the grip of Cartesian assumptions of the world, and argue that it is Heidegger himself who remains loyal to the Cartesian enterprise through forgetting the embodiment of Dasein and the sensuous material world. My study concludes that Husserl's coherent and distinctive phenomenological analyses on consciousness, subjectivity, lifeworld, embodiment, spatiality, and intersubjectivity can overcome the forgetfulness of the lifeworld, which is inherited from Descartes.

## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

Husserl and Heidegger have investigated the philosophical and historical roots of crisis that emerged in the twentieth century. The deconstructive reading of the philosophical tradition practised by Heidegger bears close affinity to Husserl's "regressively inquiring back into the original meaning of European science and of reactivating its original experience".<sup>1</sup> For them, the history of philosophy is marked by crisis, and crisis can be ideally characterised via the notion of 'forgetfulness.' They agree that the numerous controversies which give rise to a crisis in the tradition of philosophy can be overcome by means of attaining a primordial foundation, and their lines of thought are stretched with the same intensity towards seeking this foundation.

The omission of the "world" by Descartes has bred Husserl and Heidegger's controversies. Cartesian understanding of the self and world has played a pivotal role for Husserl and Heidegger in their exploration of the structures of forgetfulness. I will follow this structure to challenge Heidegger's criticism. Heidegger confronts Cartesian philosophy to distance himself gradually from Husserl. In this way, he abandons re-elaborating Husserlian phenomenology. According to Heidegger, "Husserl did not comprehend that the world is Dasein's existential structure, which could never be transformed into an "object" of reflection. This is why for Heidegger; Husserl forgets the question of Being. Husserl, like other adherents,

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<sup>1</sup> Leonard Lawlor, *Derrida and Husserl: The Basic Problem of Phenomenology* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002), p. 104.

affirms a philosophy of consciousness and forgets the phenomenon of the world”.<sup>2</sup> Heidegger criticises Husserl’s phenomenology because it represents a kind of reflective philosophy that develops the Cartesian methodology that leads to the forgetfulness of Being. A Cartesian understanding of the world is used as an instrument by Heidegger as a non-phenomenological motif for illustrating what Husserl has forgotten. However, the point I would like to pin down and constantly accentuate throughout my thesis is that it is actually Heidegger himself who attests a Cartesian legacy for the criticism of Husserlian phenomenology, despite the fact that he aims to liberate himself from Cartesian methodology. Within the framework of these determinations, the following issues will be addressed in my thesis.

In the first chapter, I will be analysing life-world as a forgotten meaning fundament, which includes the confrontation between Husserl and Cartesian legacy, and I will subsequently stretch my analysis to reveal the relationship between lifeworld and transcendental reduction. I will concisely address the Husserlian departure from the mundane to the transcendental and show how life-world is the accomplishment of transcendental reduction. Furthermore, I will demonstrate how Husserl touches upon the ontological difference through transcendental reduction.

In the second chapter, I will be moving into a detailed analysis of forgetfulness of Being and the world in Heidegger. Heidegger deals with the issue of the “world” from the perspective of Being-in-the-world. I will explicate the theme “phenomenon” and the “existential analytic of Dasein”, in which Heidegger asserts that these themes have been forgotten by philosophical

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<sup>2</sup> Lilian Alweiss, *The World Unclaimed: A Challenge to Heidegger's Critique of Husserl* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2003), p.xx5.

tradition. I will focus on the major aspects of Heidegger's criticism of Cartesian philosophy and how he detects Cartesian residue in the phenomenology of Husserl.

The third chapter is allocated to cover the convergence and divergence in Husserlian transcendental phenomenology and Heidegger's fundamental ontology. I argue that Heidegger failed to grasp, and underestimated what Husserl's transcendental reduction and constitution was able to achieve. I will also show that the Husserlian perspective has been preserved by Heidegger to some extent, although he attempts to liberate Husserl from the Cartesian-Kantian philosophy of consciousness. However, Alweiss's interpretation of Husserl will enable me to demonstrate Heidegger's explicit affiliation with Cartesian tradition. What Alweiss brings to the fore is that the facticity and materiality of the world had been world forgotten by Heidegger. I will argue that Dasein cannot recover its primordial foundation as a finite possibility, because of Heidegger's deliberate forgetfulness of Dasein's embodiment and spatiality. This leads him to recapitulate the metaphysical-technological tradition dominated by Descartes. I suggest that we should appeal to Husserlian transcendental subjectivity, in which he conceives the living body as embodied subjectivity, inter-corporeally tied to the world and other beings. I find significant insights in Alweiss's challenge insofar as she provides me with the proper ammunition to challenge Heidegger. However, I will not accept her view that Husserlian neo-Cartesianism is only a way to retrieve the world. I argue that Husserl's phenomenology has a capacity to liberate himself from "nearly all doctrinal content of Cartesian legacy."<sup>3</sup> Therefore, I contend that the analysis of Husserl regarding embodiment, spatiality,

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<sup>3</sup> Edmund Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology* trans. by Dorion Cairns, 7<sup>th</sup> edition (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1982), § 1, p.1.

and transcendental intersubjectivity, can supply an effective argument for not viewing him still as a Cartesianist.

## 1. LEIFEWORLD AND FORGETFULNESS IN HUSSERL

### 1.1. THE CONCEPT OF LEIFEWORLD

In the first part of my exposition, I develop Husserl's characterisation of the lifeworld (Lebenswelt), and its relationship with forgetfulness. The theme of life-world can be considered as a fulcrum of the later period of Husserl. Lifeworld is not entirely a novel conception in Husserlian reflection, and it goes back to *Ideas I (1913)*, in which he describes it as "my natural surrounding world."<sup>4</sup> The world became a major theme for Husserl after his transcendental turn. For Husserl, the world presents itself as a living reality, experienced and experiencing, in close correlation with an ego. Ultimately, the determination of the world originates from an ego, which is always mine. Therefore, the world is always lived in subjectivity, namely, lifeworld.<sup>5</sup> Therefore, life-world can be thought of as a continuous development of Husserl's thoughts, yet it emerges as a most developed form in *Crisis (1936)*.

Husserl recurrently made brief allusions to the lifeworld in his earlier works and gradually developed and modified his view on this concept during his entire works. This means

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<sup>4</sup> Edmund Husserl, *Ideas Pertaining To A Pure Phenomenology And To A Phenomenological Philosophy*, Volume I, trans. by F. Kersten, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1983), § 27, p.51. As Husserl writes, it is an abstraction to speak of a pure, worldless I pole, for full subjectivity is a world experiencing life. This is one of the reasons why Husserl eventually began employing concepts like lifeworld and life of world-consciousness. (Dan Zahavi, *Husserl's Phenomenology*, Stanford (California: Stanford University Press 2003) p.74.)

<sup>5</sup> Husserl, *The Essential Husserl: Basic Writings in Transcendental Phenomenology*, p. 136.

that I will also retain some dynamics of Husserl's works regarding the 'world' during my dissertation insofar as it leads me to the threshold of *Crisis* (1936). Through the discovery of the meaning of the lifeworld, Husserl has taken decisive steps toward understanding the fundamental correlation between egos and the world.

In *Crisis* (1936), Husserl introduces a project that seeks to discover the motives that lead to the forgetting of the meaning of the lifeworld and provides a robust foundation to elucidate the meaning and the priority of lifeworld. As Lewis and Staehler point out, the contemporary natural sciences are characterised by a twofold forgetfulness; on the one hand, the researching subject is forgotten (and henceforth human subjectivity as a whole), and on the other hand the lifeworld is forgotten. This twofold forgetfulness makes the natural scientific attitude nearly utterly insusceptible to philosophical criticism.<sup>6</sup> This forgetfulness amounts to a missing ground on which the natural sciences were founded: the natural world in which we reside and on which every activity rests. What Husserl attempts to do is, firstly to reveal the world that modern science is rooted and secondly, to reconcile science and life. In other words, the fact for Husserl is that science forgets its origins, namely, the pre-theoretical and pre-scientific stage of the "everyday world of life", from which it springs and from where it ought to derive its significance has been forgotten. In this respect, lifeworld signifies the natural world of a human being in which his everyday life takes place. Phenomenology, as a science of lifeworld, aims to arrive at ultimate foundations that objectivistic sciences cannot encompass.

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<sup>6</sup> Lewis, M., & Staehler, T., *Phenomenology: An Introduction* (UK: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2010), p. 42.

It is necessary to state at the outset that the descriptions mentioned concerning lifeworld in *Crisis (1936)* are inexhaustible and always require revision and insights. Firstly, lifeworld is characterised as the “forgotten meaning-fundament of natural science”.<sup>7</sup> Namely, lifeworld has become out of sight or neglected because of objectivistic and scientific standpoints. Secondly, it is a world “always already there, pre-given, existing in advance for us and to which we together belong.”<sup>8</sup> It is regarded as the correlate of the natural attitude.<sup>9</sup> Thirdly, it is considered “the original ground of all theoretical and practical life.”<sup>10</sup> Fourthly, it is identified as “a domain of originary self-evidences”<sup>11</sup> and “the ultimate foundation of the objective-scientific world.”<sup>12</sup> Fifthly, it is “the only real world which is actually given via perception.”<sup>13</sup> Sixthly, the lifeworld emerges as unthematized horizon that has by no means been brought to obvious attention<sup>14</sup>. It is not only the basis of every perception, it denotes both totality and the horizon of all recognisable and unrecognisable reality.<sup>15</sup> As Held puts it, it is nothing other than the one all-encompassing world of the natural attitude, the universal horizon. The lifeworld as the universal horizon cannot be thematised as an object, but is the unthematic space of all possible experiences.<sup>16</sup> Lifeworld is a world that discloses itself thanks

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<sup>7</sup> Edmund Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, trans. by David Carr (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), § 9, p. 48.

<sup>8</sup> Husserl, *Crisis*, § 37, p.142.

<sup>9</sup> Dermot Moran, *Husserl's Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 181.

<sup>10</sup> Husserl, *Crisis*, § 9, p. 49.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, § 34, p. 127.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.* § 33, p. 130.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.* § 9, p. 49.

<sup>14</sup> Moran, *Husserl's Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction*, p.18.

<sup>15</sup> Husserl, *Crisis*, § 49, p. 167.

<sup>16</sup> Klaus Held, ‘Husserl’s Phenomenology of Lifeworld’, in *The New Husserl: A critical Reader*, ed. by Donn Welton (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2003), pp. 32-62 (p. 58).

to the “phenomenological reduction”. This disclosure merely acquires ultimate evidence thanks to phenomenological “reduction”: the phenomenological reduction is needed to reach the total horizon, a phenomenology of phenomenological reduction.<sup>17</sup> Finally, intersubjectivity is the core aspect of lifeworld. Husserl not only argues that “self and world-constitution go hand in hand but also claims that the world and self-constitution happen intersubjectively.”<sup>18</sup> These definitions will serve as a framework around which I will organise my expositions.

## 1.2. LEIFEWORLD AS FORGOTTEN MEANING-FUNDAMENT

The immense success of mathematised natural sciences presupposes the forgetfulness of lifeworld. In *Crisis (1936)*, Husserl develops a serious criticism of the naturalistic objectivism of modern science before analysing the problem of transcendental subjectivity and the lifeworld. His criticism focuses on the uncritical assumptions taken for granted by scientific objectivism which is founded upon a philosophical thought system. The metaphysic of natural sciences was born from the mathematisation of nature in the 17<sup>th</sup> century by the enterprise of Descartes and Galileo. The crisis of modern science directs Husserl’s gaze to interrogate the question of the origin of scientific knowledge, which is an origin concealed under the many successes of scientific development. To recover scientific objectivity from its alienating nature, Husserl undertakes to explore the ground of scientific objectivity to achieve the constitution of radical transcendental subjectivism. According to Husserl, science became a set of idealisations, numbers, figures, and proportions. Galileo applies these idealisations to “nature” in its totality. Mathematisation of nature is first based on a “direct” mathematisation of some qualities such

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<sup>17</sup> Husserl, *Crisis*, § 71, p. 247.

<sup>18</sup> Dan Zahavi, *Husserl’s Phenomenology* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2003) p. 75.

as extension, shape, number, motions and time intervals; and then on an “indirect” mathematisation of “sensible qualities” related to abstract quantitative data.<sup>19</sup> For Husserl, the forgetfulness of meaning-fundament is considerable because of Galileo’s endeavour to provide an absolutely quantitative-mathematical interpretation of the whole of nature involving the qualitative completeness of sensible components.<sup>20</sup>

Husserl’s project is to reveal the limitations of abstract forms of Galilean physics and mathematics, and specifically of the universalisation of these ideal forms, which are supposed to provide a scientific explanation of the world. On the one hand, Husserl carries on analysis the “emptying of the meaning of mathematical science through technisation”.<sup>21</sup> On the other hand, he analyses the idealisation of nature and the function of Galilean natural science in the formation of nature. In this way, he demonstrates the parallel process of the concealment of the lifeworld, where nature is original and originally experienced, and through which it operates as the meaning-fundament for the natural sciences.

For Husserl, Galileo’s enterprise was expected since the previous science was characterised by finite tasks, that is, finite and a priori of Aristotelian syllogistic.<sup>22</sup> Now, beginning with the Galilean revolution, science came to be understood as the “possibility of infinite tasks”, which is intimately associated with the notion of geometric space and even the concept of geometry.<sup>23</sup> This understanding on the one hand, accomplished the presenting of

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<sup>19</sup> R. Philip Buckley, *Husserl, Heidegger and the Crisis of Philosophical Responsibility* (Dordrecht: Springer Science & Business and Media 1992), p. 45.

<sup>20</sup> J. H. Mohanty, *Edmund Husserl’s Theory of Meaning*, 3. Edition (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976), p. 138.

<sup>21</sup> Husserl, *Crisis*, § 9, p. 46.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.* § 8, p. 21.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.* § 8, p. 21-22.

science in its task of constructing any finite form in space. On the other hand, it sharpened even the unsatisfactory understanding of science itself. In other words, to refer to the world, as if it were restricted to its natural and mathematical object. Therefore, the task of overcoming the natural and mathematical conception of the world is imposed on Husserl. Consequently, the task of philosophy is to restore the natural world by a description of structures of the given as such and to show how the scientific image of the world originates. Husserl conceives a new science which can consider the lifeworld and its object and one that cannot be modelled by the sciences already existing.

The emptying of natural experience is the result of the forgetfulness of the very foundations of the mathematical model that Galileo and Descartes proposed. For Husserl, we attempt to attain reality yet we forget or neglect that this model is only “hypothesis”<sup>24</sup>, in principle unverifiable, drawing its basis from the natural world which is pre-given. In effect, the natural world is the meaning-fundament of the scientific concept of the world, and in a similar fashion, it is ingrained in the naïve realism of the natural attitude.<sup>25</sup> Consequently, according to Husserl, a rigorous universal science, which is transcendental philosophy, must not understand the world in a similar fashion to how natural science does.

At the end of the process of mathematisation of nature, Husserl sets out to retrace the thread of modern philosophy, from Descartes to Kant, namely to the history of the discussion between objectivism and transcendentalism. This path shows the progress of modern philosophy towards what Husserl describes as transcendental. He specifies that the term

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<sup>24</sup> Ibid. § 9, p. 39.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid. § 32, p.118.

“transcendental” is used in a very broad sense to designate the original motif that gives the meaning to Descartes from all modern philosophies, that of the “inquiring back into the ultimate source of all the formations of knowledge the motif of the knower’s reflecting upon himself and his knowing life in which all the scientific structures that are valid for him occur purposefully, are stored up acquisitions and have become and continue to become freely available.”<sup>26</sup> The central motive of the “inquiring back” is a process which must lead to the origin of all scientific objectivism. The reconstruction of the primordial situation of a history of philosophy presupposes a regressive path to overcome forgetfulness. As Carr points out, Husserl arrives at the generalised recognition that philosophers are burdened by historical prejudices, which, like the natural ones, are unacknowledged and hidden. Husserl not only warns us against them but also overthrows them. This overthrowing must, at the same time be a discovery. Hence, Husserl brings about the peculiar relationship between the natural attitude and its suspension.<sup>27</sup> The lifeworld is then not the objective scientific world but a forgotten foundation of the sense of science itself. It is a foundation on which the subjective and reflexive attitude of the scientist is grounded. It is an attitude masked by the polarisation of the object. Next, I will provide an analysis of the natural attitude and the thematisation of the world.

### **1.3. NATURAL ATTITUDE AND THEMATISATION OF THE WORLD**

Husserl dedicates himself to clarifying what modern science has forgotten; thus, he suggests a possibility of overcoming this forgetfulness. The Galileo-Cartesian model of science

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<sup>26</sup> Ibid. § 26, p. 91.

<sup>27</sup> David Carr, ‘Husserl’s Crisis and the Problem of History’, in *Edmund Husserl: Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers*, Volume V, ed. by Rudolf Bernet, Donn Welton and Gina Zavota (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), pp. 184-194 (p. 193).

promoted a relation to the world and a theory of this relation which is inherently opposed to phenomenology as rigorous science. What modern science absolutises and ultimately theorises is the natural attitude, that spontaneous relation of consciousness which goes through in the “captivity of object.” Husserl constantly accentuates that the “theoretical attitude, which leads to the natural science, is in fact an unnatural one. - one that participates in a detachment from life and abstraction from lifeworld, which is our natural home. In everyday life, we have nothing whatever to do with nature-objects, what we receive as things are tables, gardens, statues, clothes, tools, and so on. These are all value-objects of various kinds, use-objects, and practical objects. They are not objects that can be found in mere sensory experience or even as--- theoretically thematised in natural science.”<sup>28</sup> For Husserl, natural reflection does not have any capacity to take its own transcendental turn. An *epoché* is required to effectuate an “unnatural turn” to transcendental reflection. In fact, it is necessary for phenomenologists to attune to the new world of constituting subjectivity, just as the “learner in physics” has to learn and understand the spatio-temporal domain in a manner that allows us to let go of the naïve attitude the child to the natural world. Phenomenology possesses its own “world of experience,” different from the natural world-experience of ordinary life.<sup>29</sup>

The natural attitude, tacitly, discretely, indirectly, or unreflectively, is constantly correlated to the world as a totality of all experiences. In this attitude, we are captivated through our intentions into the world by means of our reflections on inner-worldly properties.

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<sup>28</sup> Panos Theodorou, *Husserl and Heidegger on Reduction, Primordially, and the Categorical, Phenomenology Beyond Its Original Divide* (Cham: Springer, 2015), p.178

<sup>29</sup> Dermot Moran, ‘From Natural Attitude to the lifeworld’, *Husserl’s Ideen ed. by Lester Embree, Thomas Nenon* (Dordrecht: Springer, 2013), pp. 105-124 (p.119).

Experience within the sphere of the natural attitude is always experienced in and of a world, grasped as “the world.” Husserl presents this correlation between the world and consciousness in the following way: “I am aware of a world, spread out in space infinitely, and in time becoming and become, without end. “I am aware of it, which means, first of all, that I discover it immediately, intuitively; I experience it. Through sight, touch, hearing and so on in the different ways of sensory perception, corporeal things somehow spatially distributed are *for me simply there*, in a verbal or figurative sense “present,” whether or not I pay them special attention by busying myself with them, considering, thinking, feeling, willing. Animal beings also, perhaps men, are immediately there for me; I look up, I see them, I hear them coming towards me, I grasp them by the hand; speaking with them, I understand immediately what they are sensing and thinking, the feelings that stir them, what they wish or will. They also are realities in my field of intuition, even when I pay them no attention”.<sup>30</sup> Husserl’s description of the natural attitude is not limited to the spatial horizon but also extends to the temporal horizon”. In this context, Husserl attempts to reconsider the style of natural, normal life. As he writes, “We move here in a flux of ever new experiences, judgements, valuations, and decisions. In every of this act the self or ego is directed toward objects in its environing world, dealing with them in one way or another. It is of them that we are aware of these acts themselves, occasionally just as real, occasionally in modalities of actuality (for example, as possible as doubtful etc.)”.<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> Edmund Husserl, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy*, trans. by F. Kersten (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1989) § 27. p.51.

<sup>31</sup> Husserl, *Crisis*, § 40, p. 149.

Due to the un-reflective feature of the natural attitude, the thematisation of the “worldliness of the world” does not seem possible by virtue of the ego. To put it differently, when the world is experienced in this attitude, the ego would constitute the world as if it were the whole of realities which are experienced. Lévinas maintains that “in the natural attitude, one is within-the-world, an entity amongst others; in the phenomenological attitude, one attends to the constitution of “worldliness” as such. Instead of Being-in-the-world, a part in a whole, in which meaning is somehow given in advance, such a part does not encompass or attach the world into its “mundane” being. The philosopher attends to the very “worldliness of the world”, to the whole, to the original constitution of all meaning.”<sup>32</sup> Therefore, sciences are only capable of apprehending the world as something possessing the character of an object. The “worldliness of the world” can never be manifest as something having the character of an object, and hence, never as the field of objective investigation. Philosophy can also be held “captive” in this attitude.<sup>33</sup> Husserl interrogates how Descartes went into this captivity, and I am going to elaborate on this shortly

Husserl acknowledges that there is no leeway to attaining the actual meaning of the world while dwelling on the ground of natural attitude. Therefore, Husserl re-poses the question of the world in a more fundamental and original manner. Husserl proposes an alteration of attitude, which is bracketing the “general thesis of the natural attitude.”<sup>34</sup> For

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<sup>32</sup> Emmanuel Lévinas, *The Theory of Intuition in Husserl Phenomenology*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edn (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1995), p. xxix.

<sup>33</sup> Donn Welton, ‘World as Horizon’ in *The New Husserl: A critical Reader*, ed. by Donn Welton (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2003), pp. 223-231 (p. 224).

<sup>34</sup> According to Lübcke, the general thesis of the natural attitude tells us two things, firstly, the totality of all entities, exists all the time whether or not we experience it, and secondly, the entities have more or less the

Husserl, the reduction is the suspension of our participation in naïve acceptance of the characteristic of the natural attitude. The reduction does not deny the existence of the world. It does not omit from our constant attention either entities the entities of our experience or the world as both a totality of objects and the background in and against which particular objects appear. The reduction transforms our activity by suspending our participation in the positing characteristics of natural experiences.<sup>35</sup> It possesses a peculiar advantage because it allows the thematisation of the world-appearance. This reduction reveals not the domain of pure immanence but the entire realm of the external world.<sup>36</sup> Phenomenology thereby brings to the fore the fact that there is an external world. In bracketing the world, nothing is lost, and world knowledge is acquired. Phenomenology describes how all of our experiential life- all actual, potential, or habitual positings takes place against the background of indeterminacy.<sup>37</sup> Consequently, it was demonstrated that individual objects are constantly given as a part of the world. Husserl observes that the ego is led to apprehend the world as if it were a synthesis resulting from the singular horizon. What is concluded in this analysis is that the recognition that the world presents itself to the ego as the horizon of understanding of any being is essential for Husserl. In other words, as Sokolowski puts it, what is now recognised, however, is that the world is what it is as related to transcendental subjectivity. The world remains the horizon of

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properties we experience in daily life and sciences, Poul Lübcke, 'A Semantic Interpretation of Husserl's Epoche', *Synthese*, 118.1(1999), pp.1-12 (p.2).

<sup>35</sup> John Drummond, 'The Structure of Intentionality' in *The New Husserl: A Critical Reader*, ed. by Don Welton (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003), pp. 65-92 (p.70).

<sup>36</sup>Guying Liu, *Phenomenology and Intercultural Understanding: Toward a New Cultural Flesh* (Switzerland: Springer, 2016), p. 62.

<sup>37</sup>Alweiss, *The World Unclaimed: A Challenge to Heidegger's Critique of Husserl*, p.18.

being for all individual objects belonging to it, but it is such a horizon which is limited in its being.<sup>38</sup>

After the recognition that the world is revealed as the multiplicity of phenomena in connection with the subject, Husserl, is compelled to radically overcome the natural attitude which has been analysed thus far. Husserl argues that the lifeworld, which is already given to become self-governing and is a universal theme solely by means of a “total alteration” of the natural attitude, an alteration in which we no longer live as hitherto, as humans within natural existence, always effectuating the validity of the pre-given world; rather, we permanently avoid this act. Only thus can we study the transformed and new theme that is “already-given” of the world as such: Only in this way we can study what the world is as the foundation validity for the natural life with all its projects and undertakings, and, correlatively, what natural life and all its subjectivity ultimately are, i.e., purely as subjectivity, which “functions” in effecting validity.<sup>39</sup> Husserl thus “thematizes” the lifeworld, in which “subjectivity” itself functions. He eliminates that constitution of the world from the objects that are inside it and which are “on hand” for the ego, in the same way as he reduces the constitution of the world as the final horizon of reductions to the individual objects effectuated by the ego. Through this procedure, Husserl manages to arrive at the original constitution of the meaning of the world. Next, I will analyse how the structure of forgetfulness and its relation to the world is constituted in the exemplar of Descartes.

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<sup>38</sup> Robert Sokolowski *Husserlian Meditations: How Words Present Things* (Evanston:Northwestern University Press), 1974, p.10.

<sup>39</sup> Husserl, *Crisis*, § 39, p.148.

#### 1.4. DESCARTES AND FORGETFULNESS: THE CRITISIM OF HUSSERL

The Cartesian conception of the two types of substance, *res cogitans* and *res extensa*, remains captive of the naturalistic principle of modern science. The development of objectivistic science did not leave philosophy unaffected. The contrast between objectivism and transcendentalism begins with Descartes, who is considered by Husserl “the primally founding genius of modern philosophy.”<sup>40</sup> Descartes naively believed that he could overcome the dualism of the two substances through a causal deduction, grounded on nothing else than his proposal of mathematisation of the nature of Galileo. For Husserl, philosophical knowledge is absolutely grounded and must be based on immediate and apodictic knowledge, whose self-evidence eliminates any possibility of doubt. This leads Husserl to execute “a sort of radical, sceptical *epoché*”.<sup>41</sup> Husserl, rather than taking the Cartesian approach to the unveiling of transcendental subjectivity at the root of all experience, hence ultimately as the foundation of all scientific analysis, proposes a regressive path, which is more complicated than radical doubt. It is precisely the analysis of the lifeworld, and only this can provide the right instrument to overcome the most danger of philosophy, which is solipsism.

Even though their respective approach is of an equivalent radicality, which is a radical return to *cogito*, it is in their method and finally in their discovery that we can catch what divides them. It is a fact that Husserl executed phenomenological reduction in a Cartesian way; however, he executed phenomenological reduction with a critical reformulation of the meditations of Descartes. Descartes’s legacy is positively affirmed as an “eternal significance”

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<sup>40</sup> Ibid. §16, p. 73.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid. §17, p. 75.

tendency, with which we would be called for collaboration in order to surpass naïve objectivism to transcendental subjectivism and find an “absolute foundation” for science.”<sup>42</sup> For Husserl, however, overall, the role of Descartes in the genesis of transcendental philosophy is problematic and manifestly equivocal, as is stated in *Crisis (1936)*. Descartes is the original founder of both the modern era of objectivistic rationalism and the transcendental motive that causes it to blow up.<sup>43</sup> Furthermore, he is unsuccessful in securing a self-justifying, “presuppositionless” beginning. Descartes’s ultimate interest remained nothing less than the search for the objective world.

On the one hand, Descartes is appraised by Husserl for the discovery of the *cogito* and hence transcendental subjectivity; on the other hand, he criticises him for reifying the ego as a thinking substance rather than situating it within the transcendental sphere. He eluded the point of his own reduction to the indubitable, so he failed to make a “transcendental turn” in a literal sense. Furthermore, he supposed that with his *ego cogito* he had rescued “a little tag-end of the world”<sup>44</sup> and subsequently, he inferred the world through deductive arguments.<sup>45</sup> Descartes made the ego “*substantia cogitans* a separate human”,<sup>46</sup> independent of the world surrounding him. Husserl re-describe the consciousness, which ceases to be apprehended as substance or content. Husserl describes it as stream and openness to the world. As a result, Descartes failed by falling into the absurdity of transcendental realism.

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<sup>42</sup> Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations*, § 2, p. 4.

<sup>43</sup> Husserl *Crisis*, § 16, p.73.

<sup>44</sup> Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations*, § 10, p. 24.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.* § 3, p. 7.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.* § 10, p.24.

However, Husserl thinks that the world is the reference pole of the ego: as that from which and in whose direction the ego is constituted.<sup>47</sup> A constant correlation between consciousness and world constitutes the proper theme of phenomenology. Only if consciousness is essentially determined in terms of intentionality can *cogito* acquire its full meaning. For Husserl, all consciousness is regarded as directed, as consciousness of something. What Descartes forgets is to prove the existence of objects external to the consciousness rather than analysing the domain of self-given intentional objects. For Husserl, the self-evidence of the *cogito* carried with it the self-evidence of an intentional object for a consciousness, a *cogitatum* and of a non-substantial subjective pole of consciousness, transcendental ego.<sup>48</sup> A comparison of the Husserlian position with the Cartesian doctrine of the world reveals that Descartes conceives the world as *res extensa*, the irreducible opposition to the *res cogitans*. Husserl's greatest achievement against Descartes is to find an obvious truth in the existence of the world, not the existence itself, but with its correlate, which is the ego in its most original experience. "The being of the world may no longer serve an obvious fact; rather it only poses the problem of validity."<sup>49</sup> What Husserl seeks to overcome through transcendental phenomenology is this dualism. This dualism does not allow for Descartes to demonstrate the correlativity between body and soul. Descartes, by way of doubt, suspends all belief, and there is nothing left but *cogito*. Husserl also suspends all beliefs he puts the world in brackets, that is, he suspends all of the beliefs in the reality of the world by means of *epoché*. In other words,

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<sup>47</sup> Husserl, *Crisis*, § 54, p. 186

<sup>48</sup> Suzanne Cunningham, *Language and the Phenomenological Reductions of Edmund Husserl* (Dordrecht: Springer, Netherlands), p. 90

<sup>49</sup> Edmund Husserl, *Introduction to Transcendental Phenomenology*, trans. by Cyril Welch (Canada: Ateost Press, 2003), p.5.

Husserlian *epoché* only involves a provisional suspension of the world, and in this respect, it differentiates from the method of Cartesian doubt.

The Husserlian “*epoché*” that is, the suspension of the natural world, does not mean the pure and simple disappearance of the world. On the contrary, the world remains. And it is through this procedure that “it remains purely as the correlate of subjectivity which gives it ontic meaning, through whose validities the world “is” at all.”<sup>50</sup> Husserl has been put in a defensive position because of the annihilation of the world after *epoché* and reduction. Without entering detailed consideration, the phenomenological reduction, which Husserl refers to, is combined with reduction and *epoché*. As Zahavi points out, although the *epoché* and the reduction are intimately connected and parts of one functional unity, Husserl sporadically speaks of the *epoché* as the condition of the possibility of the reduction.

Consequently, it is essential to distinguish the two: The *epoché* is the term for our abrupt suspension of a naïve metaphysical attitude and is analogous to a philosophical gate of entry. By contrast, the reduction expresses our thematisation of the correlation between subjectivity and the world. Both *epoché* and reduction can finally be seen as components of transcendental reflection, the scope of which is to free us natural(istic) dogmatism and enable us to be aware of our constitutive contribution.<sup>51</sup> As Staehler writes, “the *epoché* is particularly important as it describes the break with the natural attitude and thus the discontinuous character of the transition. Yet we need to bear in mind that reduction and *epoché* always belong together. *Epoché* designates the whole of *epoché* and reduction while highlighting specifically the aspect of

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<sup>50</sup> Husserl, *Crisis*, § 54, p. 186.

<sup>51</sup> Zahavi, *Husserl's Phenomenology*, p. 46.

refraining or suspending.”<sup>52</sup> In this way, the conduction of *epoché* and reduction have become powerful resources to attain transcendental intersubjectivity.

It has been presumed that after this event, Husserl remained with empty consciousness and detached from reality. However, what is argued in the immanent analysis of reduced consciousness is that the being of the world presents itself in a purely phenomenal character. He aims to differentiate the world explicitly from consciousness by virtue of the way in which it is given to consciousness. While acts of consciousness are given to consciousness in a complete or absolute way, the world as physical reality must constantly remain a “presumptive actuality” since, unlike consciousness, it is given to consciousness in a manifold of profiles which are never complete. The reason why the annihilation of the world is introduced is to disclose a relationship of dependence between the world and consciousness. As Husserl writes, while the destruction of the world would “modify” consciousness, since “certain ordered concatenations of experience and hence certain complexes of theorising reason oriented according to those concatenations of experience, would be excluded,” consciousness in its own existence would not be touched. Consequently, while it can be said that consciousness “is indubitably absolute being in the sense that by essential necessity immanent being nulla “re” indigent existendum,” the world on the other hand, “is entirely referred to consciousness, and more particularly, not some logically conceived consciousness but actual consciousness.”<sup>53</sup> Consequently, Husserl rectifies this false impression regarding the loss of the world, and he

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<sup>52</sup> T. Staehler, *Husserl, Hegel, Husserl and the Phenomenology of Historical Worlds*, (London; Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield International Ltd, 2017), p. 33.

<sup>53</sup> William Fay, *The Philosophical Role of the World* (Ph.D thesis , The Catholic University of America, 1987), p. 61.

reveals the correlativity of the world upon absolute consciousness. As Fay states, Husserl's disclosure of the world and of the dependence of the world upon absolute consciousness for its sense and meaning clarifies the relationship of the world to consciousness and, hence, "opens the way to the truth about the world".<sup>54</sup> Furthermore, Husserl does not affirm the dualism between ego and world as in Descartes. For Husserl, there is a mutual interdependency between them.

### 1.5. TRANSCENDENTAL REDUCTION AND LIFEWORLD

Transcendental reduction is an attempt to reclaim the originary experience and the original world forgotten by the scientific world. Lifeworld on the part of Husserl corresponds to a distance from mathematical idealisations and inquiry for a ground of originary evidences, which are neither purely objective nor logical. As Bernet points out, the phenomenological view of the lifeworld already participates in another mode of life. The phenomenologist is awakened from the dogmatic slumber of a life that is entangled with the world as a sleeping dog in his basket. This life in the world forgets the world because our attention is absorbed in the objects of the world, objects that appeal to our interest so strongly that they leave us without reprieve.<sup>55</sup> The reduction to lifeworld takes the form of a return to a foundation on which it was originated. Therefore, for Husserl, it is necessary to situate ourselves within the realm of phenomenological attitude. Husserl's suggestion "to return to the thing themselves" is only possible through executing the transcendental reduction.

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<sup>54</sup> Fay, *The Philosophical Role of the World*, p. 62.

<sup>55</sup> Rudolf Bernet, 'Husserl's Concept of the World', in *Crises in Continental Philosophy*, ed. by Arleen B Dallery; Charles E Scott; P Holley Roberts (Albany, N.Y : State University of New York Press, 1990 pp. 1-32 (p.4).

Lifeworld is the accomplishment of transcendental reduction. The *epoché* and transcendental reduction should be regarded in solidarity with each other. The effectuation of the *epoché* of the transcendental reduction leads to a step-by-step process of the constitutive accomplishments of subjectivity. What we attain for Husserl, through reduction is a science of the universal as of the pre-givens of the world, in which it is taken for granted something that is never glimpsed through any mediation in the natural attitude. In other words, this is a universal accomplishing of life, in which the world comes to be as existing for us constantly in flowing particularity, constantly “pre-given” to us.<sup>56</sup> That is, with reduction the transcendental self is in the anonymous life of my worldly subjectivity. According to Zahavi, the execution of *epoché* and of the transcendental reduction give rise a gradual comprehension of the constitutive accomplishments of subjectivity. Husserl constantly accentuates against some criticism that even though transcendental reduction is comprised of going back to transcendental subjectivity, it must not be understood in terms of a restriction to the private life of consciousness. It is fundamental to affirm that the goal of transcendental-phenomenological experience encompasses not only the phenomenologist’s own transcendently purified ego, but also the transcendental community of I’s disclosed in this ego by means of its experience of others.<sup>57</sup> Furthermore, life-world can only be a world which is carried out and penetrated by transcendental subjectivity. As Husserl writes in *Crisis (1936)*, it is the primal I who constitutes the horizon of transcendental others as co-subjects within the transcendental intersubjectivity that constitutes the world. Similarly, Fink states that transcendental reduction only comes to

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<sup>56</sup> Husserl, *Crisis*, § 38. p.145.

<sup>57</sup> Dan Zahavi, *Husserl and Transcendental Intersubjectivity: A Response to the Linguistic-Pragmatic Critique*, trans. by Elizabeth Behnke, (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2001), p. 20-79.

completion “in the full unfolding of co-constituting intersubjectivity, which is implicated in transcendental ego.”<sup>58</sup>As a result, transcendental ego is constantly constituting all sense and validity of the world; this is an activity that constantly performs both actively and passively.

What reduction brings to light is, therefore, this constituent activity that until that moment was anonymous. The transcendental reduction is the one that enables the universal correlation between the world and consciousness of the world, in which the world does not disappear yet becomes a correlate of executional subjectivity. Correlation is understood as transcendental a priori, and hence according to Husserl, “transcendental reduction means that the accomplishment of the total transformation of attitude must consist in the fact that the infinity of actual and possible world experience transforms itself into the infinity of actual and possible “transcendental experience”, in which, as a first step, the world and the natural experience of it are experienced as a phenomenon.”<sup>59</sup> Therefore, transcendental reduction, rather than ignoring the world, brings into the foreground the phenomenon of the world. As Sokolowski writes, it enables us precisely to “look at what we normally look through.”<sup>60</sup> According to Husserl, every phenomenon is a phenomenon for subjectivity; in this sense, every being and every reality, any concrete or possible object, is only given to me and accessible within and through consciousness. Consciousness, now in its most original openness to the world, discloses itself in such a way that it enables it to be rigorously investigated in its constitution, in the way in which it constitutes objects and is constituted by them. Consciousness is no longer

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<sup>58</sup> Eugen Fink, *Sixth Cartesian Meditation: The Idea of a Transcendental Theory of Method*, trans.by Ronald Bruzina (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,1995), p.5.

<sup>59</sup> Husserl, *Crisis*, § 42, p. 153.

<sup>60</sup> Alweiss, *The World Unclaimed: A Challenge to Heidegger's Critique of Husserl*, p.16.

a part of the world but the place of its unfolding in the field of intentionality. In other words, transcendental subject is not all outside of the world but is, on the contrary, the foundation of the world. This is Husserl's constant affirmation of the world; that is, that the world is the correlate of absolute consciousness.<sup>61</sup> Furthermore, this presupposes looking at the world not as it is in itself, but as what it is for consciousness, as a simple phenomenon. The subject, now living in a phenomenological attitude, turns his gaze to the phenomenological residue of reduction that is, to pure consciousness, suspending the natural interest dedicated to the object. It is then understood that Husserl's project returns to the things themselves, putting the existence of the world as an obvious fact, and as it proves, the phenomenological attitude becomes the merely theoretical attitude of the "disinterested spectator"<sup>62</sup>.

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<sup>61</sup> Paul Ricoeur, *A Key To Husserl's Ideas I* trans. by and with a Preface by Bond Harris & Jacqueline Bouchard Spurlock edited, translation revised, and with an Introduction by Pol Vandavelde (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1996) p. 49.

<sup>62</sup> Husserl, *Crisis*, § 42, p. 157.

## CHAPTER- 2

### 2. WORLD AND FORGETFULNESS OF BEING (Seinsvergessenheit) IN HEIDEGGER

Having analysed the relationship between the world and forgetfulness in Husserl, I next turn to analyse the world and forgetfulness of Being((Seinsvergessenheit) in Heidegger. The fundamental ontology of Heidegger embarks on an inclusive task, which is to uncover how the tradition of philosophy has forgotten the difference between Being and beings, namely, the ontic-ontological difference. This forgetfulness is identified as forgetfulness of Being (Seinsvergessenheit) by Heidegger. For Husserl, the essence of crisis is characterised through forgetfulness. However, forgetfulness is also central to Heidegger, although, for him, the crisis of forgetfulness corresponds to the forgetfulness of the question of Being. Therefore, *Being and Time* (1927) is devoted to revitalisation the question of Being so that fundamental ontology can overcome the crisis of forgetfulness.

For Heidegger, this forgetfulness has a twofold character. The history of philosophy not only forgets the question of Being but also forgets how to inquire about it. Philosophers were not able to pose the question of Being acceptably. Heidegger argues that the division into `whatness` and `thatness` cannot be counted as merely a doctrine of the history of metaphysics.<sup>63</sup> It also amounts to a significant occasion within the history of the being, Dasein, who bears the responsibility to inquire about the sense of Being, and has experienced its world so far through this occasion. Furthermore, the occasion that stimulates the movement of

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<sup>63</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. by John Stambaugh ( Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), p. 5.

forgetfulness gives rise to the ontological difference. As a result, it embodies the incapability to recognize the difference between Being and beings.

When Heidegger talks about a “world”, according to Buckley, “which is implicated in Dasein and without which Dasein could not “be-there,” he is generally employing this notion in the sense of “environment” (Umwelt) and in a manner analogous to Husserlian “lifeworld.” This “environing world”, with its complex networks of significance and countless projects, goes largely overlooked by Dasein, precisely since Dasein is so absorbed in the world. “The worldliness of the world” only becomes apparent when relationships break down, projects fail, and finally, the “environing world” itself dissolves as Dasein goes into the mood of anxiety (Angst). Dasein is basically oriented toward “projects”, however; it does not opt for projects in which it assigns. Projects are largely determined by the They (Das Man).” Life in the mode of the “They” expresses Buckley, is a life of crisis and forgetfulness. An “inauthentic” life does not actually belong to Dasein. The “authentic” life is true for Dasein and it consists to a certain degree of release in relation to the “They”, although this freedom or release will never comprise of a complete negation of the “They”. Unlike Husserl, Heidegger suggests that “the life of forgetfulness is never left behind or never seems to pose as a distant goal a purely authentic life.”<sup>64</sup>

What Heidegger proposes is to reconsider the history of traditional ontologies within the framework of the question of the meaning of Being. What the meaning of Being is, forgotten as the ontological difference has not been sufficiently thematised and taken for

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<sup>64</sup> Richard Buckley, *Husserl, Heidegger and The Crisis of Philosophical Responsibility*, (Dordrecht: Springer Science and Business Media, 1992), p. 163-164.

granted as the obvious theme of philosophical meditations. This leads to confusion between Being and beings. My analysis will not attempt to account for the whole connection pointed out by Heidegger between the different stages of the philosophy of history understood as the forgetfulness of Being, placing the origin of such an interpretation in the approach of Platonic metaphysics. Rather, I will analyse to what extent Descartes and Husserl have contributed to the forgetfulness of Being, according to Heidegger. In other words, because Heidegger was not convinced by the idea that Husserl's phenomenology could provide the ontological resources that his fundamental ontology had required. Heidegger criticises Husserl for granting to the transcendental consciousness, the original power of the meaning of Being, while for Heidegger the structure of Being, or of being, illuminates the manifestation of transcendental consciousness as a phenomenon. Heidegger takes Dasein as a being, which is "in each case mine"<sup>65</sup>, and he identifies, it as a philosophical point of departure to develop the thesis ontological difference. Therefore, I will delimit myself with Heidegger's criticism of the Cartesian legacy and analyse how Heidegger discovers a Cartesian residuum in Husserl's phenomenology. What Heidegger would like to do is to determine a standard with which to segregate phenomenology from those inclinations which have misconstrued phenomenology.

## **2.1. HEIDEGGER'S CONCEPTION OF THE WORLD**

Heidegger presents a philosophical project to avoid Descartes's dualistic view of metaphysics, which even Husserl could not avoid, as he himself stated. The development of Heidegger's fundamental ontology occurs primarily in a confrontation with the phenomenology of Husserl. Heidegger puts to the test his own controversy with Husserl both

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<sup>65</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*. § 25, p. 108.

on the question of subjectivity and on the crucial question of the “world”. For Heidegger, Husserl cannot unfold and phenomenologically describe the conception of the world through the discovery of immanent consciousness. Since Husserl thematised the “pure consciousness” as the foundation of phenomenological inquiry, he could not overcome the ontological difference and reply satisfactorily to the question of Being. Therefore, Heidegger finds a fundamental omission in Husserl which leads to the forgetfulness of Being. Before addressing Heidegger’s criticism of Husserl, it is necessary to illuminate what Heidegger means by “phenomenon” and the thematic character of his “existential analytic of Dasein”, which is carefully analysed in *Being and Time* (1927). The term existential analytic will be used to unfold the world and demonstrates how Heidegger can overcome the forgetfulness of Being and access a “radical beginning” and which differs from traditional ontology.

In the first place Heidegger attempts to analyse the term phenomenology, which is based on Greek roots, semantically and etymologically. When Heidegger elaborates on the phenomenological meaning of the “phenomenon”, he applies the philological analysis of the term “phainomenon” and extracts its meaning from the verb “phainesthai”, which amounts to “what shows itself in itself, what is manifest”. Phenomena is the totality of what lies in the light of the day or can be brought to the light.<sup>66</sup> Phenomenon denotes “a distinctive way something can be encountered”.<sup>67</sup> From the conception of phenomenon, Heidegger derives twofold modalities from various kinds of phenomena. The first one is that a phenomenon can manifest itself either in itself or as it is not. Namely, there is even the possibility that the being or entity shows itself as what it is not in itself. The entity seems to “look like”. Such self-showing

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<sup>66</sup> Ibid., § 7 p. 25.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid. § 7, p. 27.

Heidegger calls “semblance”. The second modality or this type of self-showing as such “indicates” something that does not show itself. Heidegger calls such an entity: appearance or “mere appearance”.<sup>68</sup> Both modes are possible thanks to a certain manifestation. The first modality is a true and proper to show itself: to show itself through what it is not. The second one cannot be counted as a manifestation, yet it is the announcement of a non-manifestation<sup>69</sup>. In this way, Heidegger attributes the term phenomenon to the positive and original meaning of “phainomenon” terminologically, and separates the phenomenon of semblance from it as privative modification.<sup>70</sup> The other part of the term “phenomenology” is the “logos”, which amount “to make manifest what is talking about” or “letting be seen or to let something be disclosed or appear”.<sup>71</sup> Consequently, the term phenomenology as considered by Heidegger is a response to Husserl’s intention to return “to thing themselves.”

According to Heidegger, only Dasein is capable of understanding the ontological difference. Heidegger insists that the “ontological difference” is the sense that Being will be fundamentally different from positive descriptions of beings and regional ontologies. Being is associated with the existential meaning that animates Dasein’s involvement in the world and with a negativity that exceeds the condition of actual beings and generates existential meanings.<sup>72</sup> The phenomenological method prepared by Heidegger is allocated to the

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<sup>68</sup> Ibid. § 7, p. 25.

<sup>69</sup> Ibid. § 7, p. 27.

<sup>70</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Philosophical and Political Writings*, ed. by Manfred Stassen (New York: The Continuum International Publishing Group Inc, 2003), p.59.

<sup>71</sup> Maduabuchi Muoneme, S.J, *The Hermeneutics of Jesuit Leadership in Higher Education: Meaning and Culture of Catholic-Jesuit Presidents*, (New York: Routledge, 2017), p.42.

<sup>72</sup> Lawrence J. Hatab, *Ethics and Finitude: Heideggerian Contributions to Moral Philosophy*, (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000), p. 12.

existential analytic of Dasein. Existential analytic is understood as a methodological procedure through which Heidegger can access the oldest and the most fundamental question of philosophy that interrogates the Being of being. In other words, existential analytic is in quest of the meaning of Being and tries to investigate thoroughly what renders it possible. The term Dasein serves to designate the manifestation of being as Being. For Heidegger, it is a Being that does not simply happen among other beings. Rather, it is ontically differentiated by the fact that in its being, this being is concerned about its very Being.<sup>73</sup> Dasein understands itself as a Being that exists.

“Existential analytic” is, in a sense, the structure of the human being’s analysis. What Heidegger aims to provide is an explication of the ontological structure of human existence. The existential analytic is the analysis of the way a particular kind of entity called “Dasein” is formally translated as “being-there,” or, according to Heidegger’s usage, Dasein can be translated as being-in-the-world. Through this term, Heidegger intended to distance his philosophy from the Cartesian subject”.<sup>74</sup>

There are two fundamental characteristics of Dasein which is characterised as “Being in the world. The first characteristic of the “Being-in-the-world” is this: its existence precedes its essence. In *Being and Time* (1927), Heidegger uses the term “existence” exclusively for the Being of the human being. “Once “existence” is understood correctly, the essence of Dasein can be thought of in terms of whose openness Being itself announces and conceals itself, grants itself and withdraws; at the same time, this truth of Being does not exhaust itself in Dasein,

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<sup>73</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, § 7 p.10.

<sup>74</sup> Timothy J Nulty, *Primitive Disclosive Alethism: Davidson, Heidegger, and the Nature of Truth*, (New York: Peter Lang, 2007), p.91.

nor can it by any means simply be identified with it after a fashion of metaphysical proposition that all subjectivity is as such also subjectivity.”<sup>75</sup>

In *Being and Time* (1927), Heidegger states, the existence indicates a mode of being, undoubtedly, particularly, the Being of that being which stands open to the opening of the openness of Being, in which it stands in while in withstanding in it. This withstanding is experienced under the name of “care”. “What is to be thought of under the name “existence”, when the word is used in the context of thinking which is prompted by, and directed toward the truth of Being, could be felicitously designated by the word “in-standing”. We must think at the same time, however, of standing in the openness of Being, of maintaining this standing-in(care) and of enduring what is most extreme, (Being-toward-death) for together, they constitute the full essence of existence”. The being that is the mode of existence is a human being. Only human being exists. The rock is, but it does not exist. The tree is, but it does not exist. The angel is, but it does not exist. God is but does not exist. The phrase, “only human being exists,” in no way corresponds to the idea that merely a human being is a real being, and that all remaining beings are not real and only have an appearance or the representation of a human being. Heidegger also argues that Dasein is privileged over and against animals and entities in terms of the ability to use language.<sup>76</sup> The phrase “human being exists means: human being is an entity whose Being is distinguished by an open standing that stands in the unconcealedness of Being, proceeding from Being, in Being.”<sup>77</sup> When Heidegger makes this

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<sup>75</sup> Martin Heidegger, ‘Introduction to What is Metaphysics’, in the *Pathmarks*, trans by Walter Kaufmann, ed. by William McNeill, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp.277-290 (p. 283).

<sup>76</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, § 34, p. 154.

<sup>77</sup> Martin Heidegger, ‘Introduction to What is Metaphysics’, *Pathmarks* trans by Walter Kaufmann, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp.277-290 (p.283-284).

reflection, on the one hand, he intends to take a critical standpoint towards the traditional conception of existential, and on the other hand, to constitute a correct meaning of the conception of existence.

The key characteristic of Heidegger's procedure is when "existential" is traditionally considered, which is characterised as a "mere appearance", namely, as a non-phenomenal reality. The meaning of the conception of existence is disclosed in *Being and Time* (1927) as follows: existence is the ownmost possibility of Dasein's being or not being itself, a possibility on the basis of which Dasein comes to be understood. Existence regarded in this sense, is never something done, complete, but it is always the "possibility of Being".<sup>78</sup> Dasein finally, the existence thus understood enjoys uncertainty, which is its dependent on the possibilities that Dasein will opt for it. Dasein, as it chooses for itself its possibilities of being, exists.

The second feature of Dasein is that "his being is always mine". Dasein is always the manifestation of a self that is myself. This determination designates an ontological constitution, but no more than that. Simultaneously, it comprises an ontic indication, though an undifferentiated one, that an "I" at all times refers to this being and not others. Dasein lives this phenomenal trait in this or that way of being.<sup>79</sup> Dasein is a being whose being is a matter of his own being, who relates to his being as his ownmost possibility.<sup>80</sup> Dasein is always his possibility, and he "has" not just in the way of property as something that "it is handy" or "present-at-hand". And because Dasein essentially, is his, in each case his possibility, this Being

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<sup>78</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, § 4, p. 11.

<sup>79</sup> Ibid., § 25, p. 108.

<sup>80</sup> Hubert, L. Dreyfus, *Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, Division 1*, (Cambridge, Mass. [u.a.] : MIT Press, 1992), p. 132.

in his being to “choose” himself to overcome, or can be lost, respectively, never and only “seemingly” to “pass over”.<sup>81</sup>

These two characteristics are sufficient to secure the grounds on which I will be able to elaborate on Heidegger’s much deeper analysis of the world. His analysis follows the scope of being the as the way to access understanding of the Being of the being that Dasein” is. To this end, Heidegger seeks to find in *Being and Time* (1927) the “average daily character” of the phenomenality of this Being through the location of the ontic and ontological constitutions that manifest the Being of the being that is always mine. There can be found the whole theme of the world. The phenomenal manifestation of the Dasein reveals itself in its finite ontological constitution, which is that of “Being in the world”. According to Heidegger, this term, announces a unique and inseparable phenomenological reality, it does not amount to the existence of the “Dasein” on the one side and the world on the other, with which it would have and an occasional and random relationship. The radical meaning of this statement hinges upon the fact that the Being of the being which the Dasein is, can only manifest itself in a world.<sup>82</sup> Consequently, based on the previous elaboration that I have made on the phenomenon and character of existential analytics, the Heideggerian conception of the “world” has gained the required foundation.

First of all, Heidegger underscores a set of ontic aspects of the world. One of them is the constitution of the world from the enumeration of all which is inside it: The houses, the mountains, the trees, and so on. Such enumeration, in addition to bringing the problem of the world to an ontic level, while it should remain on an ontological level, leads research toward

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<sup>81</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, § 9, p. 41.

<sup>82</sup> Ibid. § 12, p. 52.

the substantiality of the natural things in the world<sup>83</sup>. By means of consistently locating the problem of Being, Heidegger will be ready to encounter the issue of phenomenal “worldliness of the world”. A second alternative attempts the world from the pristine things of value with which Dasein halts. However, the conclusion to which Heidegger arrives is that “neither the ontic description of the inner-worldly beings, nor the ontological interpretation of the Being of these beings. In both modes of access to “objective” the world is already presupposed, incidentally in different ways.<sup>84</sup>

Heidegger attempts to elucidate the ontological constitution of the world through this procedure: Now, since the foundation required is not achievable by means of the ontic relevance of inner-worldly entities, Heidegger concludes that the world is a character of Dasein”. This unfolds the possibility of a pathway for the phenomenological discernment of the world without leaving behind the thematic field of existential analytic.

## 2.2 HEIDEGGER'S CRITICISM OF DESCARTES

For Heidegger, the Western metaphysical tradition began with the identification of Being as an individual thing (or being), and this identification also spread to intelligible and eternal things. The decisive point of this development, leading to our times, is recognised in the Cartesian discovery of certainty within the subject who represents to himself just that an object can be clearly isolated in the world and known through the scientific and mathematical method.<sup>85</sup> When Descartes makes a distinction between two independent substances, he

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<sup>83</sup> Ibid. § 14, p. 63.

<sup>84</sup> Ibid. § 14, p. 60.

<sup>85</sup> Edward G. Ballard, 'A Brief Introduction to the Philosophy of Martin Heidegger' in *Tulane Studies in Philosophy, Studies in Recent Philosophy*, Volume XII, (Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1963), p.109.

considers the world as something present-at-hand which is open to mathematical analysis.<sup>86</sup> For Heidegger, who presents himself as one who is able to revitalise the meaning of the question of Being and overcoming the abandonment or forgetfulness of Being, the world can be understood in an ontic sense, but not as beings essentially, unlike Dasein, which can be encountered within the world, but rather like as that in which a factual Dasein lives., factual as such “lives”:<sup>87</sup> A similar theme has arisen in previously analysed Husserlian thought. Heidegger, as a student of Husserl, assumes, the original impulse given by the meditations of Husserl. This inevitable fact can be better noticed, if it is thought of throughout this Heideggerian criticism of the Cartesian conception of the world, which opposes *res extensa* and *res cogitans*. Employing different procedures, both access this from opposite directions yet achieve pretty differentiated results. Now, the methodological difference consists of the fact that Husserl constructs his critique of Descartes from the lifeworld and the subjectivity that experiences it, whereas Heidegger criticises the Cartesian conception of the world from his existential analytic that departs from “Dasein”.

Heidegger emphasises the ontological groundlessness of the Cartesian ego. He detects in *cogito ergo sum* a planting of fatal prejudice since Descartes explores the *cogitation*, yet not the ontology of the *sum*. On the basis of this prejudice, he forgets the ontological analysis of “the mind”, which would be guided by the question of Being.<sup>88</sup> He constructs his criticism of Descartes on the premise that he would have bequeathed a defective ontological determination of the world. The entity that Descartes attempts to grasp ontologically and fundamentally in

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<sup>86</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, § 18, p.84.

<sup>87</sup> Ibid. § 14, p. 61.

<sup>88</sup> Stassen, (ed), *Martin Heidegger: Philosophical and Political Writings*, p. 54.

principle with the *extensio* is rather of such a nature that can only be initially discovered only through an inner-worldly entity that first finds itself at hand.<sup>89</sup> Descartes is not only mistaken ontologically in his definition of the world, but in that interpretation and its foundations led him to “pass over” or “skip over” the phenomenon of the world. Because of this defective determination, Descartes could not succeed considering, according to Heidegger, the phenomenon of the world and thus Heidegger asks: “What the mode of being of the Dasein fixed as the proper mode of access to that being, with whose being as an extension”.<sup>90</sup> Descartes will find in the modality of the intellect on the part of the Dasein, which is in the physical mathematical knowing, the true way of gaining access to the being of the inner-worldly entity. The being would be accessible to the mathematical knowledge. The being that is known thanks to this knowledge, is characterised by being always what it is. It is for Heidegger that Descartes assumes as being that of the being experienced in the world remains as constant permanence.<sup>91</sup>

Cartesian reflection does not enable the unveiling of the Being of the world through performing an idea of what an authentic being would be, in other words, it is predetermined regardless of its phenomenal reality. The being of the worldliness of the world is eventually transcendently recognised as if it were “mere appearance”, whose access would be merely mathematical knowledge. From Heidegger’s assertion that the world as a phenomenon is that in which Dasein factually exists, it presupposes that it is only through the analysis of the Dasein that one attains at comprehending the phenomenon. With this, the mathematical interpretation of Descartes succeeded. It remains for Heidegger to ask himself: what constitutes

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<sup>89</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, § 21, p. 88.

<sup>90</sup> Ibid. § 21, p. 88-89.

<sup>91</sup> Ibid. § 19, p. 85.

the interpretation that the “Dasein” has of itself. The Being of the being that Dasein is, should be understood as being-being. Thus understanding, as a project, is the mode of Being of the Dasein in which it is its possibilities as existence. It is possible to develop the possibilities that constitute the project that Dasein is. The fundamental possibility of Dasein, in its phenomenal everydayness originates from its dealing with its own being. The dereliction (Geworfenheit) of the Dasein means the same, above all it is in the world in which he concerns.

### 2.3. HEIDEGGER'S CRITICISM OF HUSSERL

Heidegger's criticism against Husserl can be found in *Prolegomena History of the Concept of Time* (1925) in a more explicit and extensive way. Although *Being and Time* (1926) comprises some criticisms about interrogating Husserlian Cartesianism, *Prolegomena* (1925) considerably unveils and extends this criticism systematically. I will restrict myself to *Prolegomena* (1925) in order to elaborate on Heidegger's criticism. Heidegger develops his criticism under the general conviction of the necessity of the phenomenological overcoming of the history of philosophy. As he expresses, “We are confronting with completely new tasks that have nothing to do with traditional philosophy.”<sup>92</sup> Their disagreement originates from a common ground of both, which is the transcendental orientation of the phenomenological examination. Heidegger's criticism primarily concentrates on “intentionality” and “transcendental reduction.” Heidegger intends to overcome the narrowness of the epistemological interpretation of Husserl through realising transcendental phenomenology as an ontology. Furthermore, Heidegger maintains

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<sup>92</sup> Karin de Boer, *Thinking in the Light of Time: Heidegger's Encounter with Hegel*, (Albany, N.Y.: State Univ. of New York Press, 2000), p. 22.

that phenomenological reduction or *epoché* is merely a residue of Cartesian egoistic procedure, and he maintains that phenomenological reduction is “un-phenomenological and indeed purportedly phenomenological.”<sup>93</sup>

As Marion points out, phenomenology is not fully phenomenological for Heidegger since it remains imprisoned by uncriticised, even undiscerned, Cartesian decisions. Therefore, his departure from the Husserlian interpretation of phenomenology is carried out through a critique of the Cartesian presuppositions in it.<sup>94</sup> Heidegger detects a solipsism in Husserl by asking: “How is it all possible that the sphere of pure consciousness, which is supposed to be separated from every transcendence by an absolute gulf, is at the same time united with reality in the unity of the real human being, who himself occurs a real object in the world.”<sup>95</sup> Heidegger will attempt to solve this solipsism through the structure of “being-in-the-world” Although Heidegger acclaims his master for overcoming the Cartesian representationalism, Husserl again becomes the target of criticism due to not being loyal to phenomenology. Heidegger constantly expresses his approval and acknowledges his debt to Husserl, but in *Being and Time* (1927), Heidegger explicitly shows his distance.

Heidegger examines Husserl’s phenomenology in terms of approaching the question of Being. The metaphysical conception of being shows the limitation of the method used by Husserl. For Heidegger, the problem of transcendental constitution of the “world” is a problem of ontology, which could only clarify the mode of Being of the being in which the world is

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<sup>93</sup> Alweiss, *The World Unclaimed: A Challenge to Heidegger's Critique of Husserl*, p. 78.

<sup>94</sup> Jean L Marion, ‘The Ego and Dasein’ in *Reduction and Givenness: Investigations of Husserl, Heidegger, and Phenomenology*, (Evanston, Ill. : Northwestern University Press, 1999), pp. 77-107 ( p. 81).

<sup>95</sup> Heidegger, *Prolegomena*, § 10, p. 101.

constituted. What Heidegger thinks of the most questionable in Husserl's standpoint is the view that the place of the transcendental ego, which Husserl calls 'pure ego' is "ontologically neutral".<sup>96</sup> For Heidegger, in Husserl's phenomenology, the problem of consciousness and its constitutional intentionality, which are related to the world, is not sufficiently grounded upon the ontological domain. The world is analysed in its isolation and on an ontic-eidetic level. As previously shown, Husserl has examined the correlation between the world and the consciousness of the world, the a priori correlation between noema and noesis, as the essence of the ego as *cogitare* as a correlation between *cogitato* and *cogitatum*. (act and content of the act).

According to Heidegger, the "thing itself" cannot be understood insofar as it is not examined ontologically. Heidegger asserts that the thing itself is deeply veiled in direct response to Husserl's claim to return to the things or matter themselves. Husserlian intentionality analyses the object-directedness of consciousness. Heidegger understands the intentionality of consciousness as relating to something broader and more existential.<sup>97</sup> Husserl, before affirming the absolute character of consciousness, or the supposed absolute supremacy of transcendental consciousness, as the foundation of intentionality, must have asked what the being of consciousness means in general. Without analysing the ontology of consciousness, Husserl has given primacy to the consciousness towards the world.

In *Prolegomena* (1925), Heidegger distinguishes four different determinations of the 'pure consciousness' in Husserl, and deepens his analysis by showing how Husserl's

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<sup>96</sup> Ronald McIntyre, 'Husserl and Representational Theory of Mind', *Historical Foundations of Cognitive Science*, ed. by J.C. Smith (Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1990), pp. 211-233 (p. 216).

<sup>97</sup> Helen Tattam, *Time in the Philosophy of Gabriel Marcel* ( Ph.D thesis, University of Nottingham, 2001) p.52

transcendental phenomenology goes in a Cartesian direction. As Stapleton points out, Husserl secured these four essential determinations through phenomenological reduction.<sup>98</sup> The criticism of Heidegger begins with these determinations. Consciousness is characterised by Husserl as follows: immanent being; secondly, absolute being, in the sense that it is absolutely given; thirdly, absolutely given, in the sense that it does not need anything to exist; fourthly, pure being.<sup>99</sup> For Heidegger, Husserl cannot, with one of these determinations, capture the being of consciousness, namely, reaching the ontological level onto which Heidegger is about to move. Heidegger goes on to explain these determinations in detail.

With the first determination, consciousness as “immanent being” is understood as a relation between acts; namely, it is understood as being-in something else. Furthermore, a relation, is possible between, lived experiences themselves, between the reflecting act and the reflected.<sup>100</sup> Heidegger’s critique wants to show that this determination is not ontological: there is only immanence insofar as consciousness operates a reflection on its own acts, as a withdrawal from the lived reflection on the lived of the act which it is. Immanence, in this sense, is not a radical determination of being of consciousness, but only a character of consciousness, and only a character of consciousness in a particular operation of it that is the reflective operation.<sup>101</sup> Husserl ontologically determines consciousness as immanence, and makes the equation between immanence and reflection. In the first case, that of pure consciousness as immanent

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<sup>98</sup> Timothy Stapleton, ‘Heidegger and Categorial Intuition’ in *The Question of Hermeneutics: Essays in Honor Joseph Kockelmans*, ed. by, T. Stapleton (Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1994) pp. 209-237 (p. 228).

<sup>99</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Prolegomena, History Conception of Time*, trans. by, Theodor Kisiel, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985), § 11, p. 102.

<sup>100</sup> Dermot Moran, ‘What Does Heidegger Means by Transcendence of Dasein’, *International Journal of Philosophical Studies*, 22.4 (2014), pp. 491-514 (p. 506).

<sup>101</sup> Heidegger, *Prolegomena, History Conception of Time*, § 11 p.103.

being, the being of immanent “acts” is left undetermined.<sup>102</sup> For Heidegger, human being in his lived, factual intentionality is Being-in-the-world, i.e. always “outside” the supposed immanence of consciousness and concernfully absorbed in the worldly context of meaning.<sup>103</sup>

The second determination, which is absolute being, implies that “the reflection upon acts gives entities whose existence cannot in principle be negated.”<sup>104</sup> The lived reflection is absolutely given. Conscious experiences are absolute versus transcendent, since they are direct representations (they are captured in themselves) in front of the transcendent that is constituted by indirect representations. This thesis is based on the first, of these; namely, on the indication of the reflective character of being phenomenon, which, however, has not been clarified ontologically and is based on a reductive abstraction inherited from a modern objectivistic prejudice. In other words, the first two determinations argue that they do not thematise consciousness as it is in itself, “but as far as it is possible in reflection.”<sup>105</sup> In this determination, the being of this alleged “absolute” is left in silence.<sup>106</sup>

The third determination, absolutely given, which means absolutely given in the sense that it does not need anything else to exist. Husserl’s approach bears similarity to the Cartesian definition of substance, which has its origin in Aristotle. Consciousness would be “subject” in the metaphysical sense of the Aristotelian substance, as philosophical tradition thought of it.

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<sup>102</sup> James Luchte, *Heidegger's Early philosophy: The Phenomenology of Ecstatic Temporality* (London: Continuum, 2011), p. 38

<sup>103</sup> Thomas Sheehan, Heidegger’s Philosophy of Mind, in *Contemporary Philosophy: A New Survey*, Vol.4, ed. by G. Floistad, (The Hague, Nijhoff, 1983), pp.287-318 (p. 294).

<sup>104</sup> Einar Øverengen, *Seeing the Self: Heidegger on Subjectivity* (Dordrecht; Boston : Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998) p.90.

<sup>105</sup> Heidegger, *Prolegomena*, § 11 p.104

<sup>106</sup> James Luchte, *Heidegger's Early philosophy: The Phenomenology of Ecstatic Temporality*, p. 38.

The existence of consciousness is understood to be absolute, unlike anything really transcendent, which is relative in so far as it reflects on transcendental consciousness. The transcendent being will always be presented precisely as the object of intentionality. In this characterisation the distinction between constituted, which is relative being and constitutive, and absolute being is introduced with subjectivity over every objectivity. For Heidegger, neither such determination takes consciousness into its being, but takes consciousness into the region of constitutional order and assigns to it in this order a formal role of being earlier than objective.<sup>107</sup> Heidegger considers that he find a point where idealism in the sense of new Kantianism interferes with phenomenology. In this determination `pure consciousness`, as that which is independent of reality is not affected by “annihilation of the world of things”.<sup>108</sup> This is a consideration which Descartes had already employed.<sup>109</sup>

The final determination is pure consciousness, and it is obtained by Husserl through transcendental reduction, which consists of consciousness in its purity, “when the whole world is put out of circulation, including ourselves as well as all kind of cogitare”. The being of consciousness is pure since it is determined as ideal, and not as real. Transcendentally purified consciousness is an abstracted consciousness that has broken all ties with its intentional correlate: a region of consciousness no longer in its concrete and living individuation, but considered in the abstract, purely in its content of essence. In this determination, the meaning given to being is that of an ideal, not actual being.<sup>110</sup> Common characteristics can be constituted

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<sup>107</sup> Heidegger, *Prolegomena*, § p. 106-107

<sup>108</sup> James Luchte, *Heidegger's Early philosophy: The Phenomenology of Ecstatic Temporality*, p.38.

<sup>109</sup> Alweiss, *The World Unclaimed: A Challenge to Heidegger's Critique of Husserl*, p.24.

<sup>110</sup> James Luchte, *Heidegger's Early philosophy: The Phenomenology of Ecstatic Temporality*, p. 38.

in the four determinations, in order to demonstrate that they cannot adequately question the meaning of being. What they share is that they have in a way aroused entity or being itself. For Heidegger, Husserl does not ask about the character of consciousness, rather, he asks how the consciousness of a possible object can become an absolute science. The idea of absolute science is the guideline of Husserl's work, and in formulating it in this way he adopts much of the mistakes of modern philosophy. What this criticism indicates in terms of Heidegger is that elaborating pure consciousness as the thematic field of phenomenology is not obtained phenomenally by a going back the things themselves but by going back to a traditional idea of philosophy.<sup>111</sup> I will be analysing and criticising this view in the next chapter.

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<sup>111</sup> Ibid. p. 38.

## CHAPTER 3

### 3. THE RECOVERY OF THE WORLD AND FORGETFULNESS

Heidegger's works are devoted to distinguishing himself from Husserlian phenomenology. Heidegger's criticism against Husserl is generally directed at early and middle-era Husserl. While participating in a similar cultural climate, there is a need to respond to the acclaimed objectivism of sciences and to recall philosophy into its true origin, and finally Husserl and Heidegger come to formulate different conclusions. Initially, Heidegger adopts an attitude in which he identifies Husserl's phenomenological thought as it was grounded in *Logical Investigations*, and explicitly the principle of "to the thing themselves". *Logical Investigations* serves as a theoretical and methodological groundwork for Heidegger's critical analysis of Husserl. Heidegger observes a fundamental omission in Husserlian phenomenology, and points to an immanent criticism in Husserl's works, which are primarily focused on three notions: "categorical intuition", "intentionality," and the "original meaning of a priori". Heidegger analyses these notions in order to have a rigorous consideration of "phenomena", so that he is able to contest this with Husserl. The adherence of Husserl to the Cartesian legacy has become the main theme in Heidegger's criticism as has been demonstrated in previous chapter. In this part, I will argue that Heidegger's attempt to overcome forgetfulness fails because of the unsatisfactory phenomenological analyses and misappropriating presuppositions of Husserl's phenomenology. I will not agree with Heidegger when he argues that Husserl is not inclined to give phenomenology an openly ontological direction. In this respect, I am going to bolster Alweiss's point in which she determines a strategy to encounter Heidegger's assertion that ontology comes first, and epistemology comes second. In fact, according to Husserl,

ontology and epistemology go hand in hand. As Alweiss writes, Heidegger failures to solidify his assertion that he has “salvaged” the phenomenon of the world, which Heidegger relies on philosophical tradition has forgotten.<sup>112</sup>

My criticism of Heidegger leads me to defend Husserl’s phenomenology. In this respect, I will defend myself based on Alweiss’s criticism of Heidegger. Throughout this chapter, I argue that Alweiss discovers in Heidegger’s criticism a kind of obstinacy and a repudiation of indebtedness to Husserl, even though Heidegger constantly states his indebtedness to Husserl. I will develop some specific aims in struggling with Heidegger’s criticism of Husserl. Firstly, I will explicate how Heidegger misinterprets Husserl’s phenomenology through departing from ‘categorical “categorical intuition”, “intentionality” and “original a priori” and how these misunderstood notions spread over the whole phenomenology of Heidegger. Secondly, I will focus on how Heidegger omits the significance of corporeality as an aspect of the phenomenological revelation of Dasein as Being-in-the-World. Thus, I will be able to show the misunderstandings from this peculiar issue. Thirdly, I will expand Alweiss’ criticism to Heidegger under the title of corporeality and intersubjectivity, since it is necessary to relocate Husserlian phenomenology on the grounds of transcendental intersubjectivity. I can now turn my attention to the confrontation between Heidegger and Husserl and use what I have said up to this point as a background.

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<sup>112</sup>Alweiss, *The World Unclaimed: A Challenge to Heidegger's Critique of Husserl*, p.92.

### 3.1. DOING JUSTICE TO HUSSERLIAN DISCOVERY

#### 3.1.1. CATEGORICAL INTUITION

In Husserl's *Logical Investigation IV*. Heidegger discovers a task that he sets for himself to pose the question of Being and an immediate necessity for the reformulation of this question. He states that in the entirety of modern thought, stemming from Descartes, subjectivity thus constitutes the barrier to the unfolding of the question of Being.<sup>113</sup> What Heidegger discovers in Husserl's categorical intuition, is an area in which the determination of Being can be examined through the phenomenological method. His discussion tries to pin down whether Husserl was really able to plant the question of Being or not through categorical intuition. He intends to elaborate on the notion of "categorical intuition" which is "a concretion of the basic constitution of intentionality." It makes visible the structures within which we discover beings visible.<sup>114</sup> Initially, Heidegger affirms that Husserl's discovery of categorical intuition "for the first time" demonstrates the categories. He sees Husserl as finally resolving the old dispute about the problem with universals. Namely, through this insight, phenomenology in fact, attains the objectivity sought in vain by ancient ontology. In this way, he does justice to Husserlian phenomenology because by providing the tools for grasping the revelation of the question of Being. Husserl's distinction between sensory and categorical intuition allows Heidegger to see the significance of the distinction for the multiple questions of multiple

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<sup>113</sup> Martin Heidegger, 'Translators' Foreword' *Four Seminars* (Bloomington, IN : Indiana University Press, 2003), p.xv.

<sup>114</sup> Alfred Denker, 'Being and Time: A Carefully Planned Accident' in *The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger's Being and Time*, ed by, Mark A. Wrathall (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 54-84 (p.71).

meanings of Being.<sup>115</sup> Thereafter, Heidegger misinterprets Husserl's theory of categorical intuition against the intention of Husserlian phenomenology, and asserts that Husserlian intuition is not a form of intuitionism. He suggests that categorical acts are "founded", or based on sense intuition. This offers what Heidegger calls a "specific sense of being, being in the sense of being-true".<sup>116</sup> However, according to Majolino, Heidegger understands *Fundierung* as *Analogie*, so he had suffered a misinterpretation. The categorical intuition is "founded" upon a perceptual intuition, which Heidegger misunderstands as its being "analogous" namely, to the only "proper" kind of intuition<sup>117</sup>. Therefore, I am also arguing that Husserl was able to plant the question of Being through categorical intuition.

### 3.1.2. INTENTIONALITY AND COMPORIMENT

The conception of intentionality is fundamental to Husserl's phenomenology. Heidegger does not see "intentionality as a structure of consciousness, but as a structure of Dasein, for it is Dasein's understanding of Being that makes intentionality possible. Dasein comports itself to entities and is the "bearer" of intentionality. Whereas Husserl considers theoretical modes of intentionality, especially the intentionality of perception, as being primary, with practical modes of intentionality being based on them".<sup>118</sup> Alweiss argues that although

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<sup>115</sup> J.N. Mohanty, *Husserl and His Others in Edmund Husserl's Freiburg Years: 1916-1938* (Yale University Press, (2011) 441- 462 (p.456)

<sup>116</sup> Tom Rockmore, *Kant and Phenomenology*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), p.152.

<sup>117</sup> Claudio Majolino 'Husserl and Vicissitudes of the Improper', in *The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy*, VIII ed. by Burt Hopkins and John Drummond, (London and New York: Routledge, 2008), pp.73-93(p.49).

<sup>118</sup> Michael Watts, *The Philosophy of Heidegger* (London and New York: Routledge, 2014), p.27.

Dasein's understanding is not a matter of theoretical reflection or Cartesian doubt, but of comportment, structurally Heidegger appears to recapitulate Husserl's moves: while Husserl's phenomenology finds "the principle of all principles" in the intentional structure of consciousness, *Being and Time*(1927)'s initial point is the existential structure of Dasein's comportment to Being. The transcendental constitutive site is no longer the pure ego but Dasein. In addition, not only Husserl but also Heidegger works with a dualistic schema. According to Husserl, radical doubt reveals the "dualism" between immanence and transcendence; and for Heidegger, Dasein's questioning comportment toward Being reveals the "dualism" between Being and beings. The distinction between Being and beings is so closely intertwined with the dichotomy between Dasein and beings of another character than its own that the whole analysis appears to repeat structurally Husserl's differentiation between immanence and transcendence.<sup>119</sup>

### 3.1.3. THE A PRIORI

Heidegger, by means of basing himself on the findings of Husserl's *Logical Investigations*, has described phenomenology as an "analytic description of intentionality in its a priori". Firstly, intentionality in its a priori is the basic field of phenomenological research: it denotes the search for structural elements of entities in their being, through transcendent comportments directed towards the meaning of entities.<sup>120</sup> This corresponds with Husserl's

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<sup>119</sup>Alweiss, *The World Unclaimed: A Challenge to Heidegger's Critique of Husserl*, p.76.

<sup>120</sup> Catriona Hanley, *Being and God in Aristotle and Heidegger: The Role of Method in Thinking the Infinite* (Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield, cop, 2000), p.133.

consideration on natural standpoint, as the exemplary field of concrete individuations.<sup>121</sup> Secondly, categorical intuition is the originary way to access of these structures, the method of this phenomenological research.<sup>122</sup> This corresponds to a reflection of movements of reduction, not only eidetic but also phenomenological.<sup>123</sup> Finally, the method is descriptive in that categorical acts express through accentuation what is originally intuited along with perception, in pre-predicative understanding. Accentuation is a form of analysis, in that it shows up theoretically what has been pre-predicatively understood in the primary act of transcendence<sup>124</sup> This corresponds in Husserl, with an account of a description of absolute, pure or transcendental consciousness with reference to its type of being.<sup>125</sup>

Overall, although Husserl “even lightly touches upon” it, Heidegger acknowledges that Husserl’s phenomenology obviously can pose the question of Being. According to previous analysis, it is noticeable that Heidegger’s phenomenology consists of various juxtapositions and repetitions of Husserlian phenomenology. However, for Heidegger, these repetitions and juxtapositions do not mean that he is going to conform with Husserl. He repeats in order to overcome what Husserl has forgotten or neglected. Heidegger’s confrontation with Husserl is in a sense identical to the confrontation of the claims of post-Platonic tradition. Therefore, overcoming Husserl will correspond to overcoming what has been forgotten throughout the

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<sup>121</sup> Timothy J. Stapleton, ‘Heidegger and Categorical Intuition’ in *The Question of Hermeneutics: Essays in Honour of Joseph J. Kockelmans*, Vol. 17, ed by, Timothy J. Stapleton, (Dordrecht: Springer Science & Business Media, 2012), pp. 209-237 (P.225)

<sup>122</sup> Catriona Hanley, *Being and God in Aristotle and Heidegger: The Role of Method in Thinking the Infinite*, p.133.

<sup>123</sup> Timothy J. Stapleton, ‘Heidegger and Categorical Intuition’, p.225

<sup>124</sup> Catriona Hanley, *Being and God in Aristotle and Heidegger: The Role of Method in Thinking the Infinite* p.133.

<sup>125</sup> Timothy J. Stapleton, ‘Heidegger and Categorical Intuition’ *The Question of Hermeneutics: Essays in Honor of Joseph J. Kockelmans (Contributions To Phenomenology)*, ed. by Timothy J. Stapleton, (Dordrecht: Springer Science & Business Media, pp.209-234 (p. 225).

history of philosophy. Now, it is time to criticise and put to the test Heidegger's claims with regard to Husserl.

### 3.1. CARTESIAN LEGACY IN HUSSERL AND HEIDEGGER

I argue that although Heidegger attempts to eliminate the Cartesian legacy, it is Heidegger himself who attests a Cartesian legacy when he criticises Husserlian phenomenology. It has been demonstrated that the high point of criticism becomes concrete when Heidegger analyses the four determinations that define consciousness; immanence, absolute being, absolutely given and pure being. I argue that these determinations are also misinterpreted by Heidegger. Heidegger argues that Husserl in fact affirms claustrophobic immanence, which excludes the possibility of a moment of exteriority. However, as Merleau-Ponty would put it, in line with Husserl, subjectivity is essentially oriented and open toward that which it is not, be it worldly properties or the Other, and it is exactly in this openness which it reveals itself to itself. What is revealed through cogito, consequently, is not an *enclosed immanence or a pure interior self-presence*, but an openness toward alterity a movement of exteriorisation and perpetual self-transcendence. It is by being given to ourselves that we can be conscious of the world.<sup>126</sup> Furthermore, as Alweiss puts it, Heidegger wipes out the world without leaving any traces behind, since he rejects the possibility of doubting the existence of the world in the first place. This leads Heidegger to the denial of any form of exteriority. Dasein's transcendence is much more claustrophobic than Husserl's account of immanence.<sup>127</sup>

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<sup>126</sup> Zahavi, *Husserl's Phenomenology*, p.106.

<sup>127</sup> Alweiss, *The World Unclaimed: A Challenge to Heidegger's Critique of Husserl*, p.76 p.xxvi

When Heidegger argues that consciousness is secured as an “absolute being”, he made erroneous judgement. Since Husserl’s absolute should be taken as a “non-metaphysical” absolute, he denies the absolute since he wishes to preserve its independence and transcendence.<sup>128</sup> With regards to the third determination, which is absolutely given being, this goes to the heart of the modern conception. Heidegger has argued that this priority given to being of consciousness should be understood as epistemological, not ontological, and for Heidegger this represents the “rationalistic bias” which was inaugurated by Descartes. However, what Husserl goes on to speak of is the merely “phenomenal being” of the transcendent as opposed to the absolute being of the immanent.<sup>129</sup> While immanent objects are absolutely given, the absolute stream is given only in the manner of a Kantian ideas.<sup>130</sup> In fact, Heidegger merely transfers subject’s constitutive role to Dasein, and he repeats the tradition. The priority and centrality given to Dasein, is radically different from that given to subjectivity. Whereas, for Husserl the priority given to consciousness leads to a radical division between immanence and transcendence Dasein opens up to the horizon within which beings can appear. Not only is Dasein at the centre of the investigation, but it is in terms of Dasein that there is Being. As Alweiss writes, these claims remind us of Husserl’s description of consciousness as “requiring nothing else in order to exist.”<sup>131</sup> Finally, the fourth determination of consciousness, is “pure or essential being”. The problem for Heidegger is that Husserl forgets

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<sup>128</sup> Dan Zahavi, *Husserl and the ‘Absolute’ Philosophy, Phenomenology, Sciences: Essays in Commemoration of Edmund Husserl* ed. by C. Ierna et al. Vol 200 (Dordrecht: Springer Science & Business Media, 2010) pp. 71-92. (p. 83).

<sup>129</sup> Dermot Moran, ‘Immanence, Self-Experience, and Transcendence in Edmund Husserl, Edith Stein, and Karl Jaspers’, *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly*, 82.2 (2008), pp.266-291 (p.274)

<sup>130</sup> Alweiss, *The World Unclaimed: A Challenge to Heidegger's Critique of Husserl*, p.68.

<sup>131</sup> *Ibid.* p.76.

the fact that acts of perception essentially belong to a concrete individual human being that finds itself in a real world. In this way, Husserl abandoned the principle of phenomenology, which is “returning to the thing themselves. However, Alweiss maintains that Heidegger himself turns away from the world. Heidegger’s affirmation of the world cannot be derived from materiality either.<sup>132</sup> Thus, Dasein’s dislocation of subjectivity does not lead us back to a moment of materiality of embodied Dasein. Furthermore, to follow Merleau-Ponty, it is impossible ever bring intersubjectivity into play if one understands constituting consciousness as a pure-being-for-itself.<sup>133</sup> Consequently, Dasein’s distinctiveness and its constitutive rule could not be appropriately grounded because of the negligence of touching and sensibility.

In this way, Heidegger postulates that Husserl’s phenomenology has only thematised consciousness through various assumptions presumed obvious and evident. Alweiss argues that Heidegger’s criticism of Husserl as a latent Cartesian has a positive aspect; particularly that criticism strengthens the significance of underscoring Husserl’s final challenge in *Crisis (1936)* to concretise consciousness through the intentionality of life.<sup>134</sup> While Husserl seeks to rescue Descartes from his own pitfalls, namely, he develops “internal objections” to Cartesian scepticism and endeavours to replace it with that what he calls a “criticism of cognition”. Heidegger, who seems fully anti-Cartesian regards Husserl as a representative of Cartesian legacy. Heidegger manages to “reclaim the world which Cartesian tradition has purportedly overlooked”.<sup>135</sup> Indeed, Heidegger, as it has been showed that he does justice partially to

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<sup>132</sup> Ibid. p.78.

<sup>133</sup> Dan Zahavi, *Husserl and Transcendental Intersubjectivity: A Response to the Linguistic-Pragmatic Critique*, p.150.

<sup>134</sup> Frank Schallow, ‘Book Reviews’ *The World Unclaimed: A Challenge to Heidegger’s Critique of Husserl* by Lilian Alweiss, *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*, 35.2(2004) pp.214-215,(p.214).

<sup>135</sup> Alweiss, *The World Unclaimed: A Challenge to Heidegger’s Critique of Husserl*, p.xxiv.

Husserl's project not only for overcoming "Cartesian representationalism", but also for raising and even answering the question of Being. Therefore, as Alweiss contends, Heidegger's objections should not be understood in terms of the internalism/externalism debate. What Heidegger objects to is Husserl's "transcendental turn". However, transcendental reduction does not lead Husserl to advocate an internalist position. To the contrary, the *epoché* leads us to look at the world and phenomena within it without assuming an inner-outer distinction. Furthermore, it can be shown how Heidegger's criticism of Husserl's immanentism cannot be justified.<sup>136</sup> I will also, in line with Alweiss, contend that Husserl's phenomenological project should not be understood in terms of the internalism/externalism debate. Since, for Alweiss, Husserl does not study intentional objects as intrinsic to acts. Husserl in fact seeks to account for an extra-mental reality and he can only do this by addressing the problem of "constitution and reduction"<sup>137</sup>. Consequently, it is highly problematic to adopt an isolated analysis of Husserl's phenomenology without taking into account "constitution and reduction".

### 3.2. THE TRANSCENDENTAL TURN

'Transcendental turn', implies a Husserlian movement that departs from the natural attitude to transcendental subjectivity. In a natural attitude, we do not talk about things as phenomena. The transcendental turn focuses on them as phenomena; we become conscious of their appearing as appearing, we focus on their phenomenality, their correlation to consciousness, and we realise that there may be differences in the way the things appear. As Carman writes, we can understand eidetic structures as the anonymous conditions for the

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<sup>136</sup> Ibid. p.17.

<sup>137</sup> Alweiss, *The World Unclaimed: A Challenge to Heidegger's Critique of Husserl*, p.5.

appearing of things as individuals and as facts, but conditions which in their turn can also become manifest to consciousness through essential intuition. Thus, essences function in the appearing of things and it is only when we focus on the appearing of things that the status of essences become intelligible. The transcendental viewpoint lets us do this.<sup>138</sup> Ernst Tugendhat has contended that, in the transcendental reduction, Husserl goes back to not to a “worldless subject”, but to the transcendental phenomenon, the world. Indeed, by means of *epoché*, Husserl then moves into the dimension of Heidegger’s Being-in-the-world. “Heidegger is mistaken”, Tugendhat concludes, “when he claims to have overcome the problem of epistemology with his notion “Being-in-the-world.” What we put in brackets is the natural world that is taken for granted, and it is precisely the execution of reduction<sup>139</sup> According to Kern, Husserl has a plaguing concern with treating not just regions of the world, within the world, but the “world as world.” Husserl is dealt with by taking into account the whole “being,” the world in its totality, to be philosophical. For it is not by suspending the mundane world as a whole through the phenomenologist’s free will that the world in its totality can become the theme of phenomenological philosophy. In the final analysis, it is such a move that motivates the Cartesian reduction as the negation of the world.<sup>140</sup> Through a phenomenological attitude, we not only become aware of the givenness of the object, but indirectly we also discover subjectivity as a condition of the possibility of manifestation as such. While the Cartesian doctrine demonstrates a subject separate and independent of reality, thus providing ammunition to the

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<sup>138</sup> Taylor Carman, *Heidegger’s Analytic: Interpretation, Discourse and Authenticity in Being and Time* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p.82.

<sup>139</sup> Taylor Carman, *Heidegger’s Analytic: Interpretation, Discourse and Authenticity in Being and Time* p.83.

<sup>140</sup> Anthony J. Steinbock, *Home and Beyond: Generative Phenomenology After Husserl* (Evanston: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1995), p.99.

widespread interpretation through which phenomenology analyses the structures of autonomous, isolated “worldless subject”, the ontological paths make it clear that subjectivity is inseparable from the philosophical reflection of the world. From this point of view, it can be said that Husserl is interested in consciousness as the field of manifestation of the world.<sup>141</sup> Now, I will turn to see how Husserl’s phenomenology enables us to understand how Dasein’s embodiment dislocates subjectivity.<sup>142</sup> Husserl will show the limitations of *Being and Time* (1927) through the issue of and embodiment of Dasein.

### 3.3. SPATIALITY AND EMBODIMENT IN HEIDEGGER AND HUSSERL

One of the central problems of Heidegger’s thinking is Dasein’s spatiality and its embodiment. The issue of Dasein’s bodily nature arises in the context of the analysis of Dasein’s spatiality. Heidegger’s omission of the matter of embodiment is motivated through latent Cartesian legacy. The existential status of Dasein’s spatiality has become a major threat for Heidegger’s purely finite interpretation of a fundamental ontology of Dasein. He seeks to explain Dasein’s spatiality through Dasein’s familiarity with the world and attempts to derive Dasein’s spatiality from the existential (and ultimately temporal) structures of Dasein’s Being-in-the-world. According to Alweiss, through making spatiality of Dasein secondary, Heidegger omits the role of embodiment. In this way, Heidegger skips over the world by denying a return to the embodied Dasein. Although Heidegger assumes that Dasein’s spatiality is not a result of its bodily nature, Heidegger’s concepts, which are present-at-hand and

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<sup>141</sup> Dan Zahavi, ‘Husserl’s Noema and the Internalism/Externalism Debate’, *Inquiry*, 47.1(2004), pp. 42-66 (p.60).

<sup>142</sup> Alweiss, *The World Unclaimed: A Challenge to Heidegger’s Critique of Husserl*, p.107.

readiness-to-hand, in which extant beings are encountered, inherently implies Dasein's bodily nature.<sup>143</sup>

According to Heidegger, as Alweiss puts it, Descartes is not mistaken in defining the physical world by virtue of its extension. The problem is that he overlooks the existential-ontological significance of spatiality. Cartesian analysis of the world is not the world of nature defined in terms of extension but a world and spatiality which is specific to Dasein. According to Heidegger, the two essential characteristics of Dasein's spatiality are de-severance and directionality, which are existential. Dasein discovers its being in the inner-worldly space through circumspective dealings. This spatiality should not be confused with the traditional descriptions of space, since space is not in the subject, as a form of intuition, nor as Descartes believes "is the world in space". Space is not in the subject, nor, is the world in space. This spatiality is neither in nor external to Dasein. Dasein's spatiality should be understood adverbially. Dasein is essentially de-severant, which amounts to making farness vanish, namely, making the remoteness of something disappear, bringing it close. Dasein has an essential tendency toward closeness. Saying "around the corner or the hill" has its own precision that cannot correspond to metric space. The geometrico-mathematical model fails to describe this tendency towards closeness, since closeness is not explicable in terms of objective mathematical laws but only in terms of familiarity and what is environmentally in reach. The distance or closeness of the entity at hand in the world does not overlap with metric space. It is primarily regarding what concerns us. The measurement of distances conceals the spatiality of Being in. The picture I appreciate is closer than my glasses on the nose. The acquaintance on the street

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<sup>143</sup> Ibid. p. 142.

or the friend with whom we are talking on the phone are closer than the sidewalk or the telephone, respectively. Things are thus only present only by circumspective dealings. In this way, spatiality is defined in accordance with Dasein's engagement with its surrounding world.<sup>144</sup>

Heidegger's other conception is Dasein's directionality, which also presupposes the presence of body. As Alweiss states, "by having a perspective on beings -findings them, for example, in the fixed directions of right and left entails that one finds oneself corporeally situated in their midst. De-severance always involves directionality: to engage with beings means to find them to the left or the right, above or below, and so on"<sup>145</sup>. According to Heidegger, left and right are not something subjective for which the subject has a feeling, but they are directions of orientation. Directionality permits for orientation, for example, the difference between right and left. In this respect, Heidegger opposes Kant and states: "Orienting myself in a dark room does not suffice for my feeling of the difference between my two sides, yet the recognition of the object determined in it".<sup>146</sup> In sum, "de-severance and directionality, determine, as constitutive characters of being-in, the spatiality of Dasein .

Zahavi maintains that Husserl's analysis of embodiment has been systematically integrated into his transcendental phenomenology. It presupposes the execution of *epoché*. Husserl addresses the problem of the constitutive function of the body in connection with an extensive analysis of perception. Namely, the lived body is functioned in perception. A predominant feature in Husserl's analysis of perception is his reflections concerning the

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<sup>144</sup> Alweiss, *The World Unclaimed: A Challenge to Heidegger's Critique of Husserl*, p.81-83

<sup>145</sup> Alweiss, *The World Unclaimed: A Challenge to Heidegger's Critique of Husserl*, p.84.

<sup>146</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, § 23, p.109.

adumbrational givens of the perceptual (spatio-temporal) object. When perceiving a (transcendent) object, it is essential to differentiate that which seems from the appearance (the intuitively given), since the object is never given in its totality but is continually restricted to a certain profile. An appearance is always of something for someone. When it is realised that something always appears at a certain distance and from a certain angle, the point should be obvious. However, since the subject only possesses spatial location because of its embodiment, Husserl maintains that spatial objects can only appear for and be constituted by *embodied subjects*. There is no pure point of view and there is no view from nowhere; there is only an embodied point of view. Every perspectival appearance necessitates that the experiencing subject is given in space. However, since the subject possesses spatial location only because of its embodiment.<sup>147</sup> Therefore, the body is characterised by being present in any experience as a “zero point”, the absolute “here,” in relation to which every experienced object is directed.<sup>148</sup> Farness, nearness, left and right are only meaningful only in relation to my lived body. Husserl’s conception of the lived body in *Ideas II* could be viewed as broadening of consciousness, which would lead to the disintegration of Dasein’s unitary structure of Being-in-the-World and thus could lead to dualism. Furthermore, for Alweiss, if Dasein were always already here (thrownness) as a centre bounded by its lived body, it could never initially be over there (projection) in its possibilities.<sup>149</sup> The lived body is a source of animation, which in its capacity for movement and gesture, allows the world to emerge both in its materiality and

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<sup>147</sup> Zahavi, *Husserl’s Phenomenology*, p.98.

<sup>148</sup> Dan Zahavi, ‘Husserl’s Phenomenology of the Body’, *Etudes Phenomologiques*, 19(1994), pp.63-84 (p. 65-66).

<sup>149</sup> Alweiss, *The World Unclaimed: A Challenge to Heidegger’s Critique of Husserl*, p.146-147.

intelligibility.<sup>150</sup> In effect, “Dasein is neutral. Dasein has neither flesh nor blood. Indeed, what is accentuated is the *a priori perfect* structure of disembodied Dasein and the immaterial world. The world does not touch Dasein; it does not endure or soil Dasein, yet is interlaced with a being that is neither subject nor body”.<sup>151</sup> Consequently, as Ricoeur maintains, Heidegger has not developed the conception of flesh as a distinct existentielle. since analysing the flesh would be a phenomenological impetus of the ontology of Dasein.<sup>152</sup>

### 3.4. CORPOREALITY AND INTERSUBJECTIVITY

Intersubjectivity presupposes the corporeal reality of the Others firstly. Transcendental intersubjectivity cannot be understood without referring to embodied subjectivity, and it should be analysed in its constitutive correlation with the world. Husserl states that only when I experience the other ego I can properly speak of transcendence. The constitution of an objective world is mediated through my experience of other. “Here is the only transcendence which deserves this name, and anything else called transcendent, such as the objective world, depends upon the transcendence of foreign subjectivity. What Husserl would like to emphasise is that objects cannot be reduced to being my own intentional correlates if they are experienceable through others.<sup>153</sup> Husserl emphasizes in his later works that subjectivity, the world, and intersubjectivity are interrelated. Throughout his works, he characterises “genetic

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<sup>150</sup> Ibid. p.163.

<sup>151</sup> Alweiss, *The World Unclaimed : A Challenge to Heidegger's Critique of Husserl*, p.87.

<sup>152</sup> Paul Ricoeur, *OneSelf as Another* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), p.327.

<sup>153</sup> Dan Zahavi, *Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person Perspective* (Cambridge, Mass; London: MIT Press, 2008), p.12.

phenomenology,”<sup>154</sup> by which he is enabled to consider on the correlation between the lifeworld and the ego or, namely, to consider the world in its transcendental attitude. In *Cartesian Meditations*, for Husserl, the subject’s constitutive experience of the world goes hand in hand with the subject’s constitutive experience of its own worldly being. There is mutual interdependency between the constitution of space and spatial objects on the one side and the body’s self-constitution on the other.<sup>155</sup>

Husserl constantly focuses on the constitution of lived experiences in the lifeworld. Through investigation of corporeality, the subjectivity would be integrated into transcendental intersubjectivity, through a co-constituent experience which belongs to everyone and no one in particular. He proposes a fundamental view that “already my perceptual experience is an intersubjectively accessible being, namely, being that does not exist for me alone, but for everybody”.<sup>156</sup> Husserl maintains that the other egos are not mere representations and objects represented in me, yet they are simply “other” as transcendental phenomena of my phenomenological sphere.<sup>157</sup> In this way, he dispels the appearance of Cartesian solipsism, and

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<sup>154</sup> According to Zahavi, Husserl eventually left the view of a static correlation between the constituting and constituted. Husserl indicates in his later writings, the constitutive performance is identified through a certain reciprocity insofar as the constituting subject is itself constituted in the very process of constitution. It is against this groundwork that one ought to comprehend assertion from *Cartesian Meditations* to the effect that the constitution of the world implies a mundanisation of constituting subject. In other words, the subject’s constitutive experience its worldly being. This why Husserl also speaks of mutual interdependency between the constitution of space and spatial objects on the one side and body self-constitution on the other. (Zahavi, *Husserl’s Phenomenology*, p.75.)

<sup>155</sup> Zahavi, *Husserl’s Phenomenology*, p.75.

<sup>156</sup> Dan Zahavi, Merleau-Ponty on Husserl: A Reappraisal, in *Merleau Ponty’s Reading of Husserl*, ed. by Ted Toadvine and Lester Embre (Netherlands: Springer:2002), pp.3-28 (p.23).

<sup>157</sup> Zahavi, *Husserl’s Phenomenology*, p.110.

subsequently he explains the transcendental theory of the experience of other, which is characterised as “empathy”.<sup>158</sup>

According to Husserl, “what is initially constituted is a community of monads formed through various selves. This is a community which constitutes one and an identical world. In the plane of transcendental intersubjectivity, there is the intersubjective sphere of ownness.”<sup>159</sup> For Husserl, in order to reach the sphere of ownness, phenomenologists, at least, initially execute a so-called primordial reduction, which is a reduction that has the aim of isolating the sphere of ownness—the totality of all that can be constituted through isolated ego without the contribution of any other subjects. This is because, as Husserl states, only thereby will it be possible to comprehend the constituted ontological validity of the Other.<sup>160</sup> In this world, egos manifest themselves as psychophysical men. Husserl arrives at the idea that the constitution of Objective world consists harmonic system of monads. The intersubjective world also is a component of this world. The constitution of Objective World is a phase that leads to the other egos.<sup>161</sup> Furthermore, he argues that if Other ego or his own essence were directly accessible,

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<sup>158</sup>Empathy can provide useful insights that would help to understand transcendental intersubjectivity. Intersubjectivity and empathy have been developed by Husserl in the end of *Cartesian Meditations*. Husserl presents empathy as a mode of wider understanding intersubjectivity. Without going into detail, the empathetic experiences can be defined as follows. The transcendental theory of experiencing the other is called “empathy”. It implies a direct or mediated access to the other egos. What for an individual subject, prior to any relationship of empathy to other subjects, is “world”, becomes “aspect” as soon as a relationship empathy arises. An instantaneous “pairing” takes place between the empathising ego and the other, namely, between their living bodies. Zahavi, *Husserl and Transcendental Intersubjectivity: A Response to the Linguistic-Pragmatic Critique*, p. 39.

<sup>159</sup> Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations*, § 49. p.107

<sup>160</sup> Zahavi, *Husserl's Phenomenology*, p.110

<sup>161</sup> Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations*, § 50, p. 107-108.

he would only be “an instant of my essence, eventually, he himself and I myself would be identical”.<sup>162</sup>

Other ego is experienced by “analogising apperception”<sup>163</sup>. To put it differently, the body over there, which is motivated by similarity and which is perceived as an animate organism, must be derived through an “apperceptive transfer” from my animate organism”. Namely, I apprehend the body over there as a body in analogy with my own body.<sup>164</sup> Apperception being a characteristic of experiencing the other, pairing is also a universal phenomenon of the transcendental domain. Pairing is an associatively constitutive element of ego’s experiencing other. The ego and the other are necessarily given in an original pair. Husserl employs the mother-child relation in order to explicate the way in which the other is related to the I. “The mother gives birth to the child; they are genetically contiguous. So, too, the transcendental ego gives birth to and reproduces the other. In effect, Husserl figures out the realm of pure consciousness out of which all objectivity originates as the realm of others”.<sup>165</sup> It is seen that Husserl constitutes the other ego within the sphere of primordial experience. If

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<sup>162</sup> Ibid. § 50, p. 109.

<sup>163</sup> Analogising apperception, which will be used for clarifying the notion of empathy, is explained by Husserl as follows: Another body is experienced, within the field of my transcendental subjectivity, as similar to my body. This “similarity” is the product of an analogising transfer of sense from my body as animate organism to the other body as animate organism. As I am aware of myself as the ego which animates my body, so I am aware (even though of necessity this must be an indirect awareness as the Other ego and not me), through the empathic transfer of sense, of the Other ego. Thus, the Other is given as another “me”, which is another subject like me. (Husserl, *The Essential Husserl: Basic Writings in Transcendental Phenomenology*, p. 148.)

<sup>164</sup> Husserl, *The Essential Husserl: Basic Writings in Transcendental Phenomenology*, p. 147.

<sup>165</sup> Kelly Oliver, ‘The Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity’, *Ontopoietic Expansion in Human Self-Interpretation-In-Existence: The I and the Other in their Creative Spacing of the Societal Circuits of Life Phenomenology of Life and the Human Creative Condition*, Volume: LIV, ed. by Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, (Dordrecht: Springer Dordrecht 2013), pp. 117-139 (p. 122).

other ego has to be experienced as such, this can only occur when his body appears in my field of perception. In this way, the most elemental structures of corporeality have been elaborated by Husserl.

Husserl's transcendental intersubjectivity comprises at various degree of concrete analyses, as opposed to Heidegger. Heidegger analyses intersubjectivity under the notion of being-with, which means Dasein also already exists in relation with others. According to Zahavi, there are certainly striking similarities between Husserl's account of the relation between self and other, and the accounts to be found in Heidegger. In Heidegger, we encounter subjectivity within the context of an existential-ontological analysis of Dasein's Being-in-the-world. The existent Dasein is essentially being-with-others as being among inner-worldly beings. Being-in-the world is with equal originality both being-with and being-among.<sup>166</sup> The existence of other needs not to be demonstrated, rather, it manifests itself within the intimate correlation of Dasein. For Heidegger, we are not initially concerned with perceptual things in a theoretical way, yet with handling, using and taking care of things"- properties that Heidegger terms "useful things" "gear" or "equipment" whose unique mode of being he identifies as handiness-point in accordance with their ontological structure, to other persons.<sup>167</sup> As Heidegger writes, the world of Dasein is a with-world. The inner-worldly being in itself of other is Mitda-sein. These others, Heidegger expresses, are always already there in the world which Dasein inhabits. Dasein interprets itself and encounters others in the context of this world.<sup>168</sup>

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<sup>166</sup> Zahavi, *Husserl and Transcendental Intersubjectivity: A Response to the Linguistic-Pragmatic Critique*, p.126.

<sup>167</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, § 26, p.118.

<sup>168</sup> Ibid. § 23, p.108.

However, Heidegger's concept called being-with has become highly problematic due to the forgetfulness of spatiality and embodiment in his project. Disembodied Dasein would influence Dasein's relationship with others. There are various criticisms directed against Heidegger, because of his failure to expand broadly enough the intersubjective aspects of spatiality, yet he is mainly interested in "useful things" or tools". For Watsuji, Heidegger forgets the most fundamental function of spatiality, which is that constitutes the "betweenness"<sup>169</sup> of person and persons. The body is a part of human being's subjective spatiality, part of our Being-in-the-world as betweenness." Being-in-the-world, encountering other Daseins, using tools, all of these things are embodied actions and this cannot be forgotten, yet Heidegger constantly skips over this aspect of Dasein's Being-in-the-world, of Dasein as a lived body.<sup>170</sup> As we have seen, this conception has been developed by Husserl. What I have accentuated so far as the treatment of intersubjectivity cannot be detached from the relationship between subjectivity and world. I should conclude with Merleau-Ponty's remarks, that if intersubjectivity is to be possible at all, the subject must be seen as having a worldly incarnate existence, and the world must be seen as a common field of experience.<sup>171</sup>

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<sup>169</sup> According to Watsuji, the human existence is defined as "man-as-betweenness"(aidagara). This betweenness comprises of variety of relationships. It is the network that provides humanity with a social meanings. This betweenness encompasses the social, individual and embodied aspect of the self. (H. P. Liederbach, 'Watsuji Tetsurô on Spatiality: Existence Within the Context of Climate and History', *社会学部紀要* 114 (2012), pp. 123-138 (p.123).

<sup>170</sup> Erin McCarthy, *The Spatiality of the Self* (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Ottawa, 2000), p. 34-143.

<sup>171</sup> Zahavi, *Husserl and Transcendental Intersubjectivity: A Response to the Linguistic-Pragmatic Critique*, p.150.

## CONCLUSION

My analysis of forgetfulness and world has revealed a considerable amount of convergences and divergences between Husserl and Heidegger. Traditional philosophy, including its epistemological and metaphysical stresses, reaches its completion through Descartes. Therefore, Cartesian understanding of the world has served me as a ground to make confrontation between Husserl and Heidegger. I have shown that the forgetfulness of lifeworld in Husserl and the forgetfulness of Being in Heidegger thematises the same event, which is recovering the world that Descartes has forgotten. In this context, I have focused on the problems which are inherited from Descartes, such as the world-I relationship, mind-body, immanence and transcendence. I have tested Heidegger's claims of forgetfulness and how he attempts to overcome it, by comparing it with Husserl's phenomenology. I have shown that Husserlian phenomenology can reveal Heidegger's limitations to us.

Edmund Husserl explicitly differentiates himself from Heidegger through two lines: embodied subject and intersubjectivity. Through extending Alweiss's analysis, I have concluded that Husserlian phenomenology does not exhaust its possibilities, and his phenomenology

functions as indispensable tools in understanding subjectivity, intersubjectivity, embodiment, spatiality, and lifeworld.

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