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From 'brothers in religion' to 'bandits': Chechens in Mardin in the late Ottoman period

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During the nineteenth century, the Ottoman state experienced considerable difficulties in maintaining complete control of both its governance and its territories. The state therefore focused on modernising its military capabilities, as well as establishing its bureaucracy and state structure as an attempt to shore up these weaknesses. From the time of Selim III (1779–1807), the state sought to focus on improving its military capacity in order to withstand the might of hostile European powers. The Ottoman elites were also aware that the Ottoman state could not survive with the existing structure, and thus considered reform vital to maintaining the empire. In addition to the threat from external military conflicts the Ottoman state was also vulnerable because of the spread of nationalist ideas, coupled with deficits in its economy and an incompetent bureaucracy. The Russian conquest of the North Caucasus during the middle of the nineteenth century also resulted in major problems for the state, in particular the mass movement of refugees to Ottoman lands.

During this period, various North Caucasian groups, totalling over a million individuals, moved to the Ottoman Empire, commencing from the early 1860s and during the post-Russian-Ottoman War of 1877–78 and the late 1880s.¹ The majority of these people were Circassians, along with a number of Abkhazians, Chechens, Dagestanis and Ossetians. This current article examines one from among this group – the Chechens – and their journey to the Ottoman Empire, focusing particularly on those eventually settling in the Mardin region. The article shall also give a brief overview of their journey, which commenced in the North Caucasus and followed the Batum, Ardahan, Çıldır, Kars, Erzurum and Mardin route.

One could say that the Ottoman state aimed to place the Chechens on its south eastern frontier since taxation, security and state control were not as successful as the state had hoped for in the post-*Tanzimat* era in the region. By taking this step, the Ottoman state could increase its tax income and provide security for further agricultural production and refugee settlement in the region. As far as could be seen from Ottoman state archival sources, the Ottoman state did not have a consistent policy to settle refugees in its territory. Following the ever-increasing number of refugees arriving in the Ottoman Empire, the state used certain policies to organize those refugees who arrived for its own advantage. Some of the *muhacirs* were settled in areas where there were problems,² others were settled in areas to balance the Muslim-Christian populations or increase the number of Muslim people in areas where Muslims were disproportionately represented,³ and some such as the Chechens were settled on the frontiers so that the Ottomans could maintain control of the region in terms of security, finance and providing order. It must be stressed that the state expected loyalty from these *muhacirs* as the state was a Caliphate which showed benevolence to the Muslim peoples who were arriving. To increase the financial stability of the region and attain sustainable financial benefit from the refugees, the Ottoman state was to execute a host of policies. These included providing agricultural tools

to the refugees to increase production and institute tax avoidance policies for the refugees for several years with some not having to pay taxes for about 6 to 12 years.⁴

The way the Chechens were settled in the greater Mardin region was chosen by the Ottoman state according to the needs of the state not the incoming peoples. This caused problems such as hardship based on weather conditions, as the geographical conditions of the region were very different to what the Chechens were used to. For a prolonged period of time the Ottomans chose not to settle refugees to that region; instead the newcomers from the Crimea and the Caucasus were settled in the Balkans, Istanbul and the western part of Anatolia rather than the south-eastern part of the Anatolia. One could also see that the choice of the Mardin region was not based on an Ottoman preference but was, rather, a decision taken under pressure from the demands of Russian officials. Unwilling to stir up conflict with the Russians, against whom the Ottomans had faced considerable losses in this period, Istanbul took seriously their demands. However, following Russian demands, the state aimed to use the *muhacirs* as a frontline people to deal with the rebellious tribes, increase agricultural production and strengthen state control over the region in the post-Kurdish Mirlik period under the *Tanzimat* orders. The Ottomans had to play a careful balancing act that included minimising Russian agitation, accommodating the incoming populations and facilitating Ottoman authority in challenging areas. Needless to say, this balancing act was fraught with a host of challenges and issues.

The Ottoman state viewed the North Caucasians as possible allies in Anatolia, therefore ensuring that groups settled in the Greater Mardin region.⁵ However, it needs to be acknowledged that this policy was also shaped by Russia, which had no desire to find the exiled Chechens near its new colonial border in North-eastern Anatolia, and therefore forced the Ottoman state to settle them in the Mardin region. During this era, the Ottoman state experienced considerable difficulties in providing security and collecting taxes in many locations on the peripheries of its empire. Therefore, during the *Tanzimat period*, Mardin was one of the areas where the Ottoman state faced the majority of its financial, demographic and political struggles. The local assemblies (which had been established as part of *Tanzimat* reforms) found it impossible to deal with the number of refugees arriving, as well as enforcing taxation on the nomad Bedouin tribes and preventing them from attacking the cities. Although the North Caucasians (primarily the Chechens) were initially welcomed by the Ottomans as 'brothers in religion', a group of Chechen refugees were subsequently viewed as bandits, creating additional problems for the state.

In the context of this article the term *muhacir* is used not only to specify the refugee, but also to emphasize a religious brotherhood between Muslims coming to the Ottoman domains. When examining the archival sources, the use of the word *muhacir* contains an inclusionary component which attempts to recognise the fellow co-religionists from outside who came to the Ottoman Empire. The Ottomans viewed the *muhacirs* as having unique rights because they were Muslims. Additionally, the Ottoman sultan/caliph and the Sublime Porte recognised the *mucahirs* as potential new soldiers and farmers arriving in Ottoman lands and as a result it was the Ottoman state's obligation to care for and smooth the arrival of these newcomers. However, in the following years some of the Chechens started to become involved in banditry which forced a change in their status in the eyes of the state. Because of this complexity and ever-evolving situation, the state would use different tactics and terms to distinguish the bandits from other Chechen groups and peoples. This article demonstrates that although the Ottomans used the concept of 'brothers in religion' (*din kardeşliği*) to incorporate the North Caucasians, especially the Chechens, into its system, the strenuous process of settlement and later dissatisfaction from some Chechens groups about being placed in the desert of Mardin while at the same time being made to act as vanguards for the state on the frontline meant that tensions gradually arose between the varying interests of the state and the new Chechen *muhacirs*. The language of Islam used to describe this relationship points to genuineness from the state towards its co-religionists, but the practical realities and differing expectations from

both sides created a new set of complexities for the state and the *muhacirs* that went beyond the rhetoric.

The forced exile and the Chechens in the Ottoman Empire

In the North Caucasus there were roughly two different forms of resistance against the Russian forces: one was carried out in the northwest part of the Caucasus which lacked strong leadership. The second form of resistance more popularly known by many was the resistance under Imam Shamil who was the leader of the *Nakshibendi* Sufi-sect who led the resistance against the Russian conquest, but was eventually captured in 1859. Resistance in the Caucasus has mostly been associated with Imam Shamil. From time to time the Ottomans supported him directly but when the Ottomans were pressured by the Russians, they were unable to assist Shamil and the wider resistance movement. However, helping Shamil who was perceived as the protector and supporter of the Muslim resistance was quite significant for the image of the Ottomans as a state which held the office of the Caliphate. Shamil was not only an important figure for the Ottomans and Muslims but he was also a well-known figure for the Russian and European public.⁶ Therefore, despite the fact that the Ottoman state could not stop the Russian forces' progress in the Caucasus and could not always help the resistance movement, it attempted to provide settlement and security to the Muslim leadership and Muslim populations who arrived in the Ottoman domains.⁷ Providing new homes and life in the Ottoman territories was also an issue of honour for the Ottomans.

The Russian expansion into the North Caucasus had an impact on the entire Black Sea region, transforming its demography, governance and political status. Russian forces undertook the expansion on a number of levels. The first led to mass migration, with several North Caucasian groups fleeing in response to an increasing military presence. The second consisted of expansion, massacres, atrocities and forced exile committed by the occupying forces, in the name of total control and colonization of the North Caucasus. This resulted in several hundred thousand people from the region being exiled to the Ottoman Empire, arriving by traversing the Black Sea, or even on foot.⁸

Although the Ottoman state had political, financial and demographic reasons to accept the *muhacirs*, it also welcomed them because of its role in the Islamic World as the Caliphate which meant it was required to protect the *muhacirs*. The Ottomans increased the use of the Caliphate's authority which would reach its apex in the time of Abdülhamit II towards the end of the nineteenth century. During the *muhacirs'* move to the Ottoman state, settlement and process of adaptation, their status changed several times in the eyes of the Ottoman state. At the beginning of the *muhacirs'* move, the Ottoman state saw them as a 'logistical and political problem'; later on they were viewed as a 'strategic and economic source', and then as 'citizens of the state'.⁹

As mentioned, at the time, the Ottoman state had no developed settlement policy regarding the North Caucasian population: it had not foreseen the huge numbers forced to leave their homeland, having been previously informed that only a limited number of *muhacirs* were likely to migrate. The Ottoman state had agreed to accept the *muhacirs*, but had made no preparation for the vast numbers of refugees reaching the shores of the Ottoman state in Trabzon, Samsun, Istanbul, Varna and Köstence. The state was therefore in no position to deal with feeding, settling and finding accommodation for such numbers.

One solution drawn up by the Ottoman central government, the Sublime Porte, was to settle the refugees in largely inhabited locations, employing them to improve agricultural production and provide security in areas in which the state was not able to exert total control. The armed conflict with Russian forces continued until the mid-nineteenth century, while their harsh treatment, and the insecurity of their exile, acted to radicalise the North Caucasians,¹⁰ turning them

into ruthless fighters. The Ottoman state, because it was aware of this characteristic of the North Caucasians, settled them in a region in which the state had little control, including over the power to collect taxes. As noted above, the Russian expansion into the North Caucasus forced the North Caucasians to flee their homeland between the 1860s and the early 1900s, leaving either by sea or on foot. Those who left by sea were packed onto small boats on the shores of the Black Sea at Sochi and Tuapse. Many of these were heavily overloaded as they made their way to the Ottoman shores. However, the atrocities perpetrated by the Russian army resulted in the arrival of far more refugees than had been expected by the Ottoman state, who were ill-prepared and lacked sufficient resources for receiving the number of *muhacirs* who arrived. This rapidly led to a number of tragic consequences, including food shortages and the rapid spread of diseases.¹¹ The Ottomans could not help all the *muhacirs* by using the Black Sea since its fleet suffered from Russian attacks during the Crimean war.¹² Therefore, many *muhacirs* had to come to the Ottoman territory on foot. This led to other problems for the state since the Ottoman state did not have the facilities to feed and provide adequate shelter for the *muhacirs* during the long journey. For those who arrived to the Ottoman territory by sea faced problems because of the excessive number of people who arrived at the ports, lack of accommodation, lack of food and epidemics which were widespread. Those who came by sea faced extreme hardship especially between 1863–1865.

On some days more than sixty people died at the port of Trabzon. People suffered from typhus, smallpox and malnutrition, and the governing authorities had no immediate or real way of dealing with such problems.¹³ On the other side of the Black Sea, ports were full of people waiting for the ships to reach them on Ottoman territory. However, Ottoman ship transportation was not adequate for such a large-scale undertaking, and the Ottomans demanded assistance from private international shipping companies and governments such as the British.¹⁴ However, the response to this demand was unsatisfactory for the Ottomans. Therefore, because of the scarcity of ships many people were placed on the few ships available, and one could say they were packed in like sardines. Such conditions regarding issues related to transport, as well as the other adverse conditions in the ports resulted in the death of many people. Although the Ottoman government was criticized for its incompetence as the railroads were not enough and roads were not sufficient to move the *muhacirs* from one place to another, historian David Cuthell emphasizes that the level of the *muhacirs* arriving was more than the capacity of any state at the time.¹⁵

Those who arrived by land, and in particular the Chechens (who form the main subject of this article), were forced to walk from the North Caucasus to Anatolia. They approached Georgian territory, then entered the Ottoman state from the northeast of Anatolia, most likely by way of Ardahan, Kars, Erzurum, Muş, Diyarbakır and Mardin/Kızıltepe. The main gathering place was Erzurum, with some then travelling on to the Sivas region, while others remained in Muş and a further section moved to Mardin.¹⁶ Archival documents reveal that the Ottoman state had failed to draw up a well-organized settlement policy regarding the North Caucasian population, resulting in the *muhacirs* being moved between different locations in Anatolia.

Although it is difficult to establish the criteria used by the Ottoman state to settle the *muhacirs*, one clearly arose in response to the desire of the Russian Tsardom to prevent the expelled North Caucasians living close to its new colonial south border. This led to the Russian state being officially involved in the process, urging the Ottomans not to settle North Caucasians on the southern border following the end of the war between Russia and the people of the Caucasus. Furthermore, an official from the Russian consulate accompanied the refugees to ensure they were not permitted to stay in this region.¹⁷

It is notable that the Ottoman state was in no position to decide the exact place to settle the *muhacirs* arriving in East Anatolia. Several decades before the Russian expansion in to the Caucasus, the Ottomans had, as a result of financial and military deficiencies, already been in the process of losing territorial hegemony on the Black Sea and Caucasus region. Although

Russian policies and military force led to the expulsion of large numbers of North Caucasians to Ottoman lands, the state, as the Caliphate of the Muslims, was unable to prevent this mass movement and the killing of its brothers in religion by Russia.

In the early days of the *muhacir* arrivals local rulers had more responsibility than the decision-makers in the Ottoman capital, Istanbul. Settling and feeding the *muhacirs* was far beyond the capabilities of the local rulers.¹⁸ Following the Crimean War the number of *muhacirs* had increased significantly. This increase was beyond the capacity of the Ottoman state infrastructure and led to a total break-down of the social environment of some Ottoman cities such as Istanbul where mosque courtyards and streets were full of *muhacirs*.¹⁹ The Ottoman bureaucracy was not capable of finding immediate solutions to the *muhacirs'* problems and the problems created by their movement to the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, a separate bureaucratic commission was formed on 1 January 1860 titled the Muhacirin Komisyonu (Refugee Commission) by the Ottoman government in order to deal with the problems related to the *muhacirs* and meet the needs of the *muhacirs* with regard to such matters as accommodation, food and adequate healthcare.²⁰ A Circassian military man and governor of Trabzon, Hafız Paşa, was chosen as the chairman of the commission.²¹ This shows that the Ottoman government aimed to solve the *muhacirs'* problems by appointing someone who was of a similar ethnic background and shared a common past with them.

The Ottomans initially chose to locate the Chechens in Kürdistan province, i.e. the Harput, Van, Muş, Sivas and Siirt *vilayets* and *sancaks*. However, a Russian officer in charge of a group of refugees in 1865 refused to agree to this solution, preventing the Ottoman state from settling the Chechens in the eastern part of Anatolia.²² By imposing the will of the Russian state, this official ensured that the Ottomans moved the Chechens to the south of Diyarbekir in part of the desert (*çöl tarafı*), and he also stated that the Russians would not accept any resettlement to the Van and Muş regions. Although this official was only charged with the transfer of the Chechens to the Ottoman officials, he exceeded his mission by attempting to dictate the exact location for their settlement. This confidence of a Russian official in his ability to contradict Ottoman internal policy on the settlement of the Chechen *muhacirs* demonstrates the Ottomans' weak position in relation to the Russian state. This was echoed on another occasion, when, a few years later, Russia again felt threatened by the Chechens who had settled in the Şiran, Tercan and Kelkit regions (Gümüşhane/Erzurum), and who were seen as being too close to Russia's southern border, and therefore demanded they be removed.²³ This demonstrates that this was an ongoing Russian policy, which prevented the Ottoman state from locating the Chechens where it considered most appropriate.

Although the Ottomans had agreed to receive the North Caucasians, there was no clear written agreement with the Russians, and the existing agreement failed to cover the transfer of an entire population between the two states following the Russian conquest of the Caucasus in the mid-1860s. The Porte warned the local administrators that the transfer should be completed without causing any further incident (*şatamatsızca*). In addition, Nusret Paşa (who was in charge of the settlement of the North Caucasians in the region) was determined that the situation should not be turned into a quarrel between the Ottomans and the Russians.²⁴ Despite this being an issue of sovereignty, the Ottomans did not see any benefit in challenging the Russians. Nusret Paşa was warned by Istanbul that he should do as the Russians wished and locate the Chechens to Sivas, Kürdistan, Diyarbekir, Siirt, Harput and Mardin regions.

This demonstrates the different policies of the central and local administration towards the Chechens. On the one hand, the Porte considered the Chechens as brothers in religion taking refuge in the holy land of the Caliphate, and considered that they should be treated as equal with any other Muslim group living within the empire. The Porte asked local rulers to build small dwellings for all the refugees, along with maintaining their needs, i.e. providing a pair of oxen and a cart for ploughing and five kilos of seed to enable them to start agricultural production.²⁵ The Porte also allowed local rulers to ask local wealthy people for financial help.²⁶

However, these local officials viewed the Chechens as being yet another problem added to the many arising in the post-*Tanzimat* era, in particular alongside the attempt to implement the new order in the empire. This led to those in control of places such as Mardin becoming locked in a power struggle, as well as dealing with issues related to taxation, security, financial issues and implementation of the *Tanzimat* order.²⁷

Although the government attempted to organize housing for the *muhacirs*, it did not always specify an exact city or region, with the Porte allowing some to move to other cities.²⁸ A group of approximately forty individuals, unhappy with their new location in Urfa, left for Sivas without asking permission from the local governor. Part of their motivation may have been the presence of a relative already settled in the area, as well as considering it a more congenial location as it was mountainous like the Caucasus and not as hot as Urfa. However, the Ottoman Porte considered that if this group were allowed to settle in Sivas, they would be joined by the other Chechens located in Urfa.²⁹ These Chechens were viewed as being in a wretched state by the governorship of Sivas, in particular after walking the entire way with insufficient food.³⁰ The Ottoman Porte was sympathetic, understanding the conditions which had forced the Chechens to move.³¹ However, the high number of North Caucasians arriving on the shores of Trabzon resulted in the Porte being unwilling to show sympathy to the Sivas governorship for fear of encouraging the remainder of the Chechens in Urfa to move as well.³² The highest point of this movement of refugees to Ottoman lands took place between 1864 and 1865. The mortality rate was very high, with almost two hundred people dying every day in Trabzon as a result of lack of food and from disease. These conditions made it difficult for the Porte to control a further arrival of refugees to Sivas which was seen as one of the main locations to settle newcomers from the North Caucasus.

From May 1865, several thousand Chechen refugees made their way to Erzurum Province,³³ resulting in the state being forced to limit the numbers arriving. In addition, the Ottoman state wished to signal that no more refugees could be accepted by Erzurum-Erzincan because of insufficient funding, and chose to divert them to other regions.³⁴ The Ottoman government also chose to limit the numbers arriving in a specific region by military means. The motivation for this is unclear from the documents; however, during the early years of their settlement, refugees were moved from place to place, with those in other regions aiming to travel to Erzincan, and those in Sivas and Erzurum aiming for Mardin/Kızıltepe.³⁵ It is possible that an internal network, particularly of tribal or family ties, could have played a significant role in these movements. Although the Ottoman state welcomed the refugees, it subsequently aimed to keep the settlement process under tight control.

When the *muhacirs* were settled in their new location, and informed the state of their contentment with their conditions, the Porte did not hesitate to demonstrate this to its subjects through the press. Those who were settled in Resulayn (Urfa/Ceylanpınar) were also happy with their final location and the Ottoman rulers attempted to use this to motivate Chechens living in Erzurum to move to Resulayn.³⁶ This resulted in groups of Chechens being moved to Kızıltepe from other parts of Anatolia. Although the Ottoman government had been ill-prepared when the Chechens had first arrived in Anatolia, it now aimed to organize a transfer of people from Sivas to Diyarbakir and Kızıltepe.³⁷

Although the resettlement of the Chechens to the Mardin region happened under pressure from Tsarist Russia, one could see the decision was taken by the Ottoman state under the conditions of the Ottoman land code of 1858. What this meant was that the Ottoman Empire was in a process to expand its tax incomes and provide sustainability in its agricultural production. This was against notions that the Ottoman state was peripheral, in 'decline' and passive without creating its own economic policies.³⁸ Therefore, it can be said that the policies of the Ottoman state were not the result of Ottoman inactivity; they were rather a response of the Ottoman rulers to the changing conditions of the world order in the nineteenth century. Despite the fact that the role played by the Ottoman state was insufficient, it aimed pretty actively to

be involved in the process of finding a solution to the various problems that came into existence. The Ottoman state provided some opportunities for the *muhacirs* by exempting some from six to fifteen years' service in the military depending on their residence; it also exempted them from paying taxes, and gave them seeds and farming tools.³⁹

The relationship between the government and the Chechens tended to fluctuate, particularly during the first years, when the Ottomans viewed with suspicion the activities of groups of Chechens who had experienced conflict with the local Christians in the Muş region. The Russian state aimed to use these issues to exert additional pressure on the Ottomans, who remained unwilling to cross the Russians. The policy followed by the Ottomans was that they wished to understand the *muhacirs*' intention before deciding on whether to allow their settlement to the Muş region.⁴⁰ Internal Ottoman correspondence reveals that they wished to help the refugees and settle the Chechens on Ottoman land without risking conflict with the Russians.

At the same time, as they were unfamiliar with the region, the Chechens resisted attempts by the Ottoman government to move them to another region. During the first years of their move to Anatolia, the government forced the Chechens to move to the Siirt region from Erzurum, something they were unwilling to do, kidnapping the lieutenant responsible for settling them.⁴¹ However, approximately four hundred Chechens were, for reasons that are unclear, willing to go to Sivas, arriving without any intervention from the state.⁴² Rather than the Ottoman Porte dictating where the Chechens should settle, it asked the local governor's opinion on the settlement process, which resulted in the Chechens being moved to their new location.

Settlement, local disputes and *Tanzimat*, the Chechens in Mardin

Following the Bedirhan Bey rebellion of the 1840s, the Ottoman state removed the Kurdish Emirates/Beylik system aiming to institute the *Tanzimat* order by directly tying the region to the centre, in particular by establishing a new province, i.e. Kürdistan,⁴³ which was made up of the regions of Van, Muş, Hakkari, Cizre, Bohtan, Mardin and Diyarbekir. For the first time, the Ottoman administration system of Kürdistan was used as a name of an administrative unit, rather than a geographic definition.⁴⁴ The main objective of this decision was to restrain the chaos in the region by controlling and restricting the tribes, as well as applying strict taxation and centralization policies. The establishment of the new province allowed Istanbul to assume direct control of the region, in contrast to the previous period in which the Ottomans had ruled the region through the tribes and Emirs/Beys.⁴⁵

The *Tanzimat* reforms commenced in Mardin in 1847,⁴⁶ permitting the state to take direct control of the region and the tribes by abolishing the emirates. However, local issues resulted in the failure of these reforms. With the balance between the tribes and the state having been destroyed for the benefit of the state, some tribes and emirs gradually started to lose their influence over the region.⁴⁷ The taxation system was based on the *iltizam* system, which allowed the *mültezim* to pay tax in advance to the government, collecting it from the population at a later date. The *iltizam* was abolished by the *Tanzimat* taxation system, however; a lack of qualified workers prevented the establishment of an effective system of taxation, resulting in many returning to the previous system.⁴⁸ Financial and economic problems also created difficulties for the Ottomans, since, by keeping control of the region, the Porte was also responsible for feeding the military unit stationed there. These financial problems led the state to use the pro-state tribes' armed men, *nefir-i amm*, in addition to the existing military units, in their conflict with Arab Bedouin tribes (i.e. the Anaze and Shammar), in order to provide order and security in the region.⁴⁹

In 1858, the Ottoman administration passed the Ottoman Land Code to all Arab Provinces, apart from Egypt and the land that now forms modern Saudi Arabia.⁵⁰ The code transformed the relationship between the Ottoman state and its Bedouin subjects due to the weakness of

Ottoman rule in the rural areas which were at the time controlled by the Bedouins.⁵¹ However, the 1858 code ensured that large parts of these lands were put up for sale. It is not possible to determine whether this was an Ottoman initiative to settle Bedouin tribes, but the government aimed to reduce Bedouin influence on the political and daily life of Syria and desert part of the southern Mardin region.⁵² Previous studies have revealed that the region was closely monitored by the European Powers, in particular Britain. Several previous studies have examined the Ottoman state's relationship with the Bedouin tribes, as well as the tribes' relation with the other actors, but there remain insufficient studies focusing on the impact of later arrivals such as the Chechens to the region. With the settlement of the *muhacirs* the state had the means to extend its impact to the periphery of the empire. While the state placed the refugees in the regions to receive greater tax income, agricultural production and to provide security, it also extended its *Tanzimat* era centralization policies to its frontier regions. Although the state did not have a well-planned *muhacir* settlement policy, and it was not prepared to have such a large number of refugees, it succeeded in a few years to attain more benefit from this by settling them in the problematic regions.

The east of Syria and the greater Mardin region became an area of conflict between the Bedouin nomad tribes (who wished to gain access to the cities, residential places and cultivated fields), and the Ottoman civil and military office, who believed the nomads should remain in their desert areas.⁵³ This government policy resulted in the Circassians in Syria and the Chechens in the Mardin region being used to confront the nomad tribes, including cultivating the land and using force to maintain control.⁵⁴ Norman Lewis emphasized that this policy was successful because of government support and the Circassians and Chechens being effective fighters,⁵⁵ which also led to their recruitment for local units, and as irregulars and gendarmes.

The above implies that, during the *Tanzimat* era, the Ottoman government used the Chechens to control the tribes and collect taxes in the Mardin region. However, a deeper analysis reveals that, as noted previously, this was due to an unwillingness to engage in a further conflict with the Russians. This led the Ottoman Porte to drive the Chechens to the South of Diyarbekir and Mardin, resulting in the Chechens located to Mardin being viewed as potential allies in maintaining regional order. One example of this policy was the Porte's proposal to locate a group of Chechens in the Habur region, where a new military barrack was to be built, in order to ensure it became well populated and prosperous.⁵⁶

Following this Russian pressure, the Ottomans created a new settlement policy focused on benefitting itself, Russia and the Chechens. The Arab tribes in the Mardin, Habur, Resulayn and Cebel-i Abdülaziz regions created difficulties for the Ottoman state which was unable to control the nomad Arab Bedouin tribes and avert their attacks on the cities. The Porte therefore used military force to control the tribes, followed by settling the Chechens in the Mardin region to strengthen the presence of the Ottoman troops and so prevent further Bedouin attacks. It is worth noting that the government planned a local clinic to be opened in response to the on-going fighting and the Chechens' settlement to the region, as well as the potential health issues that arose from the Chechens being unfamiliar with living in desert conditions.

In the years before the Ottoman government began to view a group of Chechens as bandits (*şaki*), they continued to consider them as trustworthy allies against the Bedouins in the Mardin-Urfa region.⁵⁷ In 1877, the government aimed to recruit two hundred Chechens into the army to combat the Shammar tribes in the Zor region, a conflict that became a major concern for the Ottomans. Over a decade later, the Ottoman state again aimed to use the Chechens against the Shammar. Although the Ottomans viewed some of the Chechens as pernicious (*muzır*), this did not prevent them being recruited to serve with the gendarme forces.⁵⁸

The Chechens and the Circassians who were settled in the region from Mardin to Aleppo and Damascus were used as part of the Ottoman policy to recapture the region under the Ottoman Central Government. The *mamura* (Agricultural field) and *bedia* (semi-desert field) fields

were a place in which the Ottoman government and local Bedouins were struggling to maintain total control.⁵⁹ Following the Russian-Ottoman War of 1877–78, most of the North Caucasians (Chechens and Circassians) were removed from the Balkans with the ultimatum of the British because of their attacks on the Bulgarians and were sent to Aleppo, Damascus, Amman, Resulayn and Raqqa. With the increasing numbers of *muhacirs* settled in the region the Ottomans aimed to keep a line between the Bedouins and the *muhacirs* by settling them near productive agricultural fields.⁶⁰ This settlement policy became especially useful for the Ottomans since on the one hand it settled the North Caucasians near the productive fields to get more produce and raise more taxes, and on the other hand it got rid of the problems which were created by the Bedouins: many of the North Caucasians were already prepared to fight the Bedouins since their warriorlike characteristics were much more dominant than their farming ones.⁶¹

The Ottoman state's earlier settlement of the Chechens had lacked a proper policy; following the Russian-Ottoman War of 1877–1878 the state exploited the settlers for its own demography policies. This led a group of Kabardins, a sub-group of Circassians, from the Caucasus being settled in the Manbij region in 1905, in order to balance the Bedouin Arab population with the other groups, in particular the Circassians. During the time of Sultan Abdülhamit II (1876–1909), Manbij became the administrative centre of the Ottomans for this region, with population figures revealing that eight hundred of the two thousand people living in the city were Circassian.⁶²

From 'brothers in religion' to 'bandits'

As explained above, initially, the Ottoman state did not plan to settle the Chechens in the Mardin region. This was carried out because of Russian pressure on the Ottoman state. However, the Ottoman administration was able to turn this situation into an opportunity both for the Chechens and for its own administration. The Chechens would be given land to grow on and cultivate for agricultural purposes and a house to sustain their life in their new homeland. On the other hand, as Karen Barkey emphasised, the Ottoman state makers needed loyal groups to create 'direct and unified rule' over the regions.⁶³ In this context, the Chechens were a loyal group to strengthen the central authority of the state in the periphery. The Chechens became appropriate tools for the state to demilitarize the Bedouin Tribes and settle them.

However, some of the Chechens would later be seen as problematic for the state and were labelled bandits. As Eric Hobsbawm underlines bandit activity was a challenge against the 'social, economic and political order' of power.⁶⁴ Although the Chechens were initially welcomed by the Ottoman state, eventually a group in the Mardin region began to be viewed as the sources of banditry by the Ottoman Porte. This turned them from being 'brothers in religion' to 'bandits' in the eyes of the state. The Mardin region remained a battlefield between several local groups, state and tribes from the eighteenth century to the mid-nineteenth century, when the Chechens began to settle in its lands. Although the Mirs (i.e. the leaders of the tribes and tribal confederation) of the region had, from the sixteenth century, joined with the Ottoman Empire to combat the Safavid threat, the Ottoman state was unable to maintain total control and provide security in Mardin. The local struggle for control continued between the tribal leaders and prominent figures of the city. The Chechens therefore arrived to find themselves in the middle of this struggle. Both the nomad tribes (i.e. the Shammar) and the most powerful tribes (i.e. the Milli) of the region had an unstable relationship with the Ottomans. Despite the lack of any well-planned policy for the settlement of the Chechens in the region, the Ottoman state aimed to use them for its own benefit. However, not all Chechens offered absolute loyalty to the Ottoman state.

From the early 1860s, the Chechens were settled in the Resulayn region, near to the River Khabur. This resulted in the spread of diseases such as malaria, cholera and smallpox, which

caused hundreds of Chechen deaths every year.⁶⁵ In the 1880s, a new Chechen group arrived, most probably fleeing the Russian-Ottoman War of 1877–78. This led to conflicts with other local groups, such as the Shammar, and the newcomers were not welcomed by the local population because of their aggressive behaviour to neighbours and the government support for their presence.⁶⁶

When the Chechens first arrived on Ottoman land, they were known as *muhacir* (i.e. 'brothers in religion'). Their settling in the Resulayn region also created problems for the local Ottoman administration. This was, as discussed above, potentially because of their long history of conflict with Russian troops before arriving in Anatolia, along with their arduous settlement process, which led to an increased tendency towards aggression, with some resorting to violence. While many Chechens settled in the region and became ordinary farmers, one group created new problems for the Ottoman rulers, who called them *haşerat*, i.e. a harmful group akin to vermin. This referred in particular to a group of Chechens from Resulayn, who had been re-settled in the Muş/Varto region, where other Chechens had already been living for a number of decades. This group killed three civilians and two of the soldiers taking them to the court in Muş to ensure their return to their first settlement in Resulayn.⁶⁷ The local governor did not demand their arrest or execution, but the *Dahiliye Nezareti* (ministry of the interior) demanded that they should be sent back to their first settlement, Resulayn.

It is difficult to draw a direct correlation between the living conditions of this group and their demonstration of aggression. However, the two thousand households settled in the Resulayn region were said to suffer from a smell of sulphur, although its impact was unclear. However, the document stated that only two hundred of these households survived and the population was viewed as being unhealthy. Thus, if one household is calculated as containing five individuals, it can be estimated that a total of approximately nine thousand people died,⁶⁸ with only 1,200 surviving. A British military observer, Norman Lewis, also claimed that the population of the Chechens in Resulayn declined sharply from approximately five thousand in the early 1900s to less than one thousand in the 1940s.⁶⁹

The Ottomans dealt with the Chechens' attacks in a notable manner. The Chechen bandits disturbed the Mardin region with their activities, resulting in the governor of Mardin, Muhammed Enis, attempting to find a solution. He suggested that, because of the lack of any legal solution, a local administrative office should be opened, with a well-known and influential Chechen employed as its head in order to prevent further conflict.⁷⁰ It was finally decided by the *Dahiliye Nezareti* that the Chechen Yusuf Bey would be appointed to the local administration office.⁷¹

From the late 1890s, a number of actions by the Chechens were seen as harmful to the Ottoman state, transforming them from 'the brother in religion' to 'the bandit' (*şaki*). The lack of any state authority in the region led the Ottomans to employ differing policies for control; one was domestic exile which was used as punishment for those who did not obey the rules and threatened the security of the region. However, its use served to demonstrate that the state lacked sufficient power to control the Chechens and was unable to prevent recurrent issues. The lack of any effective bureaucratic system and security in the region forced the Chechens to arm themselves for self-protection, which, in some, developed into aggression.

Ottoman rulers used different strategies for those who did not follow orders and broke the law in the local areas. The leaders and elders were warned, another sub-group from the same group were ordered to control the troublemakers, or finally the troublemakers could be exiled to another place to lessen the disorder.⁷² The final option was not used as a widespread choice but it worked in the Chechens' case in Resulayn.⁷³ Once it had recognised the difficulties in controlling the Chechens, a decision was made to gradually disperse them to the Mamuretülaziz (today's greater Elazığ). This policy aimed at exiling the most problematic individuals, but without any state-sanctioned punishment. Instead, local rulers were tasked with treating the exiled Chechens as *muhacirs*. This meant that they were looked after by the state which was tasked with providing their basic needs.⁷⁴ This decision led to some Chechens being exiled following

the rejection of their request to return to settle in their former location.⁷⁵ One of those refused the right to return was Islam Bey, who subsequently escaped from Mamuretülaziz to Kızıltepe. It should be emphasized that the Ottoman state initially exiled Islam Bey to Mamuretülaziz, subsequently rejecting his demand to return to Kızıltepe, which then resulted in his escape to Kızıltepe. When the local ruler and Istanbul finally accepted that it would prove difficult to keep Islam Bey in Mamuretülaziz, it was decided that he should be moved to Mardin, where he remained.⁷⁶

A few years later, a number of Chechens from Kızıltepe once again attracted the state's attention. The Chechens had been sent individually to Kızıltepe, being separated from their new settlement. The state drew up similar policies to punish any Chechen who might prove troublesome. The first was to send them to Mamuretülaziz, but this was felt to be too close to Kızıltepe, so those who attempted to return were sent to Tripolitania.⁷⁷ One hundred of the most troublesome Chechens were sent to Mamuretülaziz,⁷⁸ and were located at some distance from each other. This decision was taken by the Meclis-i Vükela, rather than the local authority, thus demonstrating the involvement of the Ottoman central government in domestic matters and the *muhacir* settlement process in the post-*Tanzimat* era. Furthermore, the central government stated that they should be treated as *muhacirs* rather than criminals, despite the disruption they presented to the local population, including the seizing of money and animals.

As noted above, a further policy undertaken by the state to pacify the Chechens was to award them official titles and salaries and put them in charge of a region or unit. The state attempted various policies to prevent Chechen attacks on the Mardin region, including Mardin city, by those settled in the Resulayn region. However, they were able to exert little control over rural areas, which was exacerbated by existing conflicts between several groups in Mardin. It is significant that the Ottoman state lacked any effective policy to preclude this violence, instead giving official titles to the Kızıltepe Chechens to prevent the Resulayn Chechens' activities. As the state was aware that it had insufficient power to implement security in the region, it aimed to use the Chechens against each other, or create a connection between the Chechens and the state, in particular by awarding official titles to the Kızıltepe Chechens to ensure they prevented the actions of the Resulayn Chechens. The state formed a new directorship (*müdürlük*) in Kızıltepe (approximately twenty-five km from Mardin), with Chechen Yusuf Bey of Kızıltepe appointed as its head. This prevented the Resulayn Chechens, who had to pass Kızıltepe to reach Mardin, being able to threaten Mardin city.⁷⁹

In order to implement this policy, the state was forced to close a directorate in the surrounding areas, known as Silopi *müdürlüğü*, with its income being transferred to the new offices in Kızıltepe. This demonstrates that the Ottoman state was, at the time, experiencing difficulties in providing security, including in consolidating its bureaucratic structures and supplying financial support to local units. These financial issues prevented the state from dealing with the problems posed by banditry with its own troops or gendarmes, including being forced to close one directorate before opening another. Finally, it used the awarding of official positions to balance the power struggle, rather than establish a well-organized bureaucratic system to resolve existing problems. Thus, bureaucracy was employed in an attempt to resolve existing issues by awarding a title to a local individual. However, this policy could not be implemented as the rulers viewed the task of dealing with bandits as being the responsibility of the security forces.⁸⁰

Although a number of Chechens were involved in banditry, others were employed by the state, both in the regular gendarme forces and in the irregular groups, in order to support the state, and pro-state tribes, against the chaos caused by the nomad tribes of the region. One example was that Chechens were promoted by the state to ensure they took part in local tribal conflicts. This was demonstrated by the awarding of medals (*nişan*) to Zor Ahmet and Çeçen Aslan Bey for their assistance in the fight against one of the most notorious tribes of the time, the Shammar tribe.⁸¹

Conclusion

The nineteenth century was the century where enormous changes took place in the Ottoman Empire. The Ottomans were struggling to apply the necessary reforms to modernize its military capacity, bureaucracy and state structure. In addition to the reforms, with the increasing number of *muhacirs* moving, the Ottomans had to deal with the social and demographic changes that were taking place in the empire.⁸² Abruptly, in a couple of years hundreds of thousands *muhacirs* arrived in Ottoman territory. This caught the state off guard in circumstances that left them unprepared. Without having a suitable working settlement policy, while the Ottoman state, by settling the *muhacirs* far from the new Russian border in the Caucasus, aimed to not upset the Russian rulers, it did not wish to lose an opportunity to settle the *muhacirs* both to increase the agricultural production and because of demographic changes.

It can be seen that, following the war between Russia and the people of the Caucasus, the Ottoman state lacked any well-planned policies regarding the settlement of North Caucasian refugees. This was due to a failure to anticipate the number of refugees arriving in Ottoman lands in response to the atrocities committed by the Russian army. This lack of preparedness caused considerable issues for the North Caucasians when they reached Ottoman territories, and in particular the subsequent Russian involvement in the Ottoman settlement policy. Russia placed diplomatic pressure on the Ottomans not to settle the North Caucasians to the east of Sivas and the north of Diyarbekir region; the Ottomans agreed in order to placate the Russians, settling some of the *muhacirs* in the greater Mardin region, in particular in Kızıltepe and Resulayn. Further complications arose when they subsequently became part of the Ottoman order and security policies in the region, including being seen as agricultural workers and agents of security for the state, primarily tasked with preventing Bedouin attacks on city centres and agricultural areas.

However, the Chechens faced many difficulties before they reached the Mardin region. Their war against Russia had lasted for many decades, while the poor conditions they faced during their exile or migration to the Ottoman territory made them aggressive towards their neighbours. Although the Ottoman state had no initial plan to use them against any group, the North Caucasian population in the Mardin and Resulayn subsequently became allies during the *Tanzimat* era when the state implemented its centralization and taxation policy, and particularly in the battle against the Arab Bedouin tribes. However, one group of Chechens refused to follow the state's rules and were eventually also treated in the same way as the Bedouin tribes, being viewed as vermin. In addition, the state tried to address this issue by using Chechens to prevent Chechen attack.

Many studies have shown the dichotomy between the settlers and the residents of the settlement. It was believed that the Anatolian people did not want to share their pasture and lands with these newcomers. However, it is difficult to generalize since in many of the regions the local people were extremely helpful to the refugees.⁸³ Due to the poor conditions of the refugees and the state's ineffectual facilities, in many places the local people involved in the process shared their possessions and helped them to build their own houses.

Did the Ottomans use the North Caucasians, particularly the Chechens for its demographic policies? It could be said that after the arrival of refugees in the mid-1860s the Ottoman state followed a more practical and pragmatic role to settle them. The places were chosen not by chance but instead it was rather a plan to increase tax income, agricultural production or more importantly to balance the population by increasing the Muslim population in a given region. However, one could not see the same approach to the Chechen settlement in the Mardin region. The Chechens in these regions were not skilled farmers, nor were there large Christian populations pursuing a national movement in the area to balance with the Chechens as was followed in the Balkans following the Russian-Ottoman War of 1877–78; the state settled the Chechens in the Mardin region to strengthen its policy against the Bedouins in order to restrain

them and reduce their 'harmful' impact on the region and people, and to increase the state's tax income.

The *muhacirs* were used as a pushing force in the Mardin region by the state to separate the sedentary peoples and the Bedouins as they were used in the Greater Syria region.⁸⁴ By using the group, the state expanded its controlled area and in turn it boosted its income and dominance. Housing the large number of *muhacirs* from the Caucasus gave the government an opportunity to create a loyal group in the troubled regions.⁸⁵ Although in the early days of their settlement there were problems between local rulers and some of the *muhacirs*, with the accommodation of the *muhacirs* to their new place of residence and country they had a better relationship with the local rulers and state. As argued previously, the pre-1878 Ottoman settlement policy was far from being in order and could be described as 'haphazard' at best.⁸⁶ However, post-1878, the immigration policy of the Ottoman state was to prevent the empire from the Great Powers' interference, increase the Muslim sentiment of the empire by settling them in places where nationalist revolutions could happen.⁸⁷ The *muhacirs* in many places strengthened the capability of the government in terms of control, taxation, security and trade by being loyal to the state and its institutions as becoming like a buffer between the state and its opponents. From the Balkans to the Arab provinces, in the frontier regions they were seen as a group close to the state. In those regions, in the eyes of the government they were part of the state policy to increase its power and authority among those distanced and 'disloyal' groups.

Following this period, and after a few years of relative freedom as a result of the 1908 constitutional revolution, the Ottoman state was faced with the First World War. The consequences of this global conflict changed not only the region, but also the life of the Chechnian minority, in particular in response to the ensuing instability, border changes and nation-building projects of many of the states within the region.

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Notes

1. Kemal Karpat, *The Status of The Muslim under European Rule: The Eviction and Settlement of the Çerkes*, in *Studies on Ottoman Social and Political History: Selected Articles and Essays* (Leiden: Brill, 2002), p.654.
2. *Muhacir* is an Islamic term which refers to the Prophet Muhammed's journey from Mecca to Medina. We will use the word *muhacir* and refugees interchangeably. It seems inappropriate to call them migrants since they were exiled by force, massacred and dispossessed.

3. Vladimir Hamed-Troyansky, *Imperial Refuge: Resettlement of Muslims from Russia in the Ottoman Empire, 1860–1914* (PhD diss., Stanford University, 2018), p.15. Also see another study for the settlement of refugees from the Caucasus to the Elazığ, Malatya, Mardin and Diyarbakır regions: Hakan Asan, *Kırım ve Kafkasya'dan Diyarbakır ve Çevresine Göçler [Migrations from Crimea and the Caucasus to Diyarbakır and its Surroundings] (1876–1914): Elazığ, Malatya, Mardin ve Diyarbakır Örneği*, (PhD diss., Erciyes University, 2016).
4. Ibid. pp.15, 16.
5. The Greater Mardin Region refers to Mardin, Kızıltepe, Resulayn, partly today's North East of Syria and North Iraq.
6. David Cameron Cuthell Jr, *The Muhacirin Komisyonu: An Agent in the Transformation of Ottoman Anatolia, 1860–1866* (PhD diss., Columbia University, 2005), pp.134–36.
7. Ibid., pp.134–36.
8. For details of the colonization of the North Caucasus by the Russian forces, see Walter Richmond, *The Northwest Caucasus: Past, Present, Future* (New York: Routledge, 2008); Walter Richmond, *The Circassian genocide* (New Brunswick and London: Rutgers University Press, 2013); Charles King, *The Ghost of Freedom: A History of the Caucasus* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).
9. Cuthell Jr, 'The Muhacirin Komisyonu', pp.19–21.
10. Benjamin C. Fortna, *The Circassian: A Life of Eşref Bey, Late Ottoman Insurgent and Special Agent* (London: Hurst, 2016).
11. For details on their conditions see Fabio L. Grassi, *Yeni bir vatan: Çerkeslerin Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'na zorunlu göçü (1864)* [A New Homeland: The Massacre of The Circassians, Their Exodus To The Ottoman Empire and Their Place in Modern Turkey], (Istanbul: Tarihçi Kitabevi, 2017).
12. Cuthell Jr, 'The Muhacirin Komisyonu', pp.55, 56.
13. Ibid., pp.193–97.
14. Cuthell Jr, 'The Muhacirin Komisyonu', pp.193–97; Nazan Çiçek, "'Talihsiz Çerkeslere İngiliz Peksimeti': İngiliz Arşiv Belgelerinde Büyük Çerkes Göçü (Şubat 1864–Mayıs 1865)', [British Rusks for the Unfortunate Circassians: The Great Circassian Migration in British Archival Documents (February 1864–May 1865)] , *Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi* 64, no. 1 (1 January 2009), pp.57–88, doi:10.1501/SBFder_0000002088.
15. Cuthell Jr, 'The Muhacirin Komisyonu', pp.165–67.
16. Abdullah Saydam, *Kırım ve Kafkas göçleri, 1856–1876*, [Crimean and Caucasus Migrations] (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1997). The numbers of Chechens who came to the Ottoman state was not precisely known. In the early days of the exile, five thousand Chechens came to Anatolia, however, in the following period the number reached about 30,000. Saydam, *Kırım ve Kafkas göçleri*. p.147.
17. Presidency of the Republic of Turkey Directorate of State Archives (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaşkanlığı Devlet Arşivleri Başkanlığı Osmanlı Arşivleri), BOA, A_JMKT_MHM__00341_00027_005_001. Date 17 Rebiülevvel 1282 (10 August 1865).
18. Cuthell Jr, 'The Muhacirin Komisyonu', pp.98–100.
19. Ibid., pp.101, 102.
20. Ibid., p.104.
21. Hafız Paşa served in regional positions in the Ottoman army and bureaucracy in Kurdistan, Sivas, Belgrade, Mosul, Yanya, Edirne and Trabzon. Cutchell Jr, pp.107–109.
22. BOA, A_JMKT_MHM__00341_00027_005_001. Date 17 Rebiülevvel 1282 (10 August 1865).
23. BOA, MVL_01053_00028_001_001. Date 2 Cemaziyelahir, 1284 (1 October 1867). Following the Russian pressure to move these Chechens the Ottoman government aimed to send them to Sivas, however, as it was stated that there was no appropriate place '*hal'i mahal*' in Sivas for these one thousand *muhacirs*, it was decided by the Porte to move them to the Konya and Niğde region.
24. BOA, A_JMKT_MHM__00341_00027_009_001. Date 17 Rebiülevvel 1282 (10 August 1865).
25. BOA, A_JMKT_MHM__00220_00066_001_001. Date 17 Za 1277 (27 May 1861).
26. Ibid.
27. Suavi Aydın (ed.), *Mardin: Aşiret-Cemaat-Devlet* (Istanbul: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı, 2000), pp.288, 289. İbrahim Özcoşar, *Merkezileşme sürecinde bir taşra kenti Mardin (1800–1900)*, [Mardin: A Taşra/ Provincial City in the Time of Centralization] Şarkiyat Enstitüsü Hazırlık yayınları, no: 1 (Mardin: Mardin Artuklu Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2009).
28. BOA, A_JMKT_MHM__00220_00066_001_001. Date 17 Za 1277 (27 May 1861).
29. BOA, MVL_00715_00118_001_001. Date 8 Recep 1282 (27 November 1865).
30. BOA, MVL_00715_00118_002_001. Date, 5 Cemaziyelahir 1282 (26 October 1865).
31. BOA, MVL_00715_00118_003_001.
32. BOA, MVL_00715_00118_004_001.
33. BOA, ŞD__03218_00013_001_002. Date Şaban 1285 (December 1868).
34. BOA, A_JMKT_MHM__00369_00014_001_001. Date 14 Recep 1283 (22 December 1866).
35. BOA, A_JMKT_MHM__00388_00053_001_001. Date 5 Recep 1284 (2 November 1867).
36. BOA, A_JMKT_MHM__00356_00031_001_001. Date 4 Muharrem 1283 (19 May 1866).

37. BOA, MVL_01047_00075_001_001. Date 9 Cemaziyelahir 1284 (8 October 1867).
38. Hamed-Troyansky, *Imperial refuge*, pp.138, 139.
39. *Ibid.*, pp.62–64.
40. BOA, MVL_01051_00011_001_001. Date, 4 Cemaziyelahir 1282 (25 October 1865).
41. BOA, MVL_00715_00112_001_001. Date 26 Cemaziyevvel 1282 (17 October 1865).
42. *Ibid.*
43. Cemal Ülke, 'Diyarbakir ve Çevresinde *Tanzimat'a* Karşı Tepkiler', in Oktay Bozan, Hakan Asan, Hatip Yıldız and Mehmet Salih Erpolat (eds), *Tanzimat'tan Günümüze Diyarbakır*, vol. 1 [Reactions to the *Tanzimat* in "Diyarbakir and Its Surroundings", in *Diyarbakir from the Tanzimat to the Present*], (Ankara: Manas Yayıncılık, 2019), pp.156–70.
44. However, the name Kürdistan was not based on an ethnic definition; it was still related to a geographic description. İbrahim Özcoşar, 'Osmanlı Modernleşmesi/Merkezileşmesi ve Kriz: Mardin ve Çevresinde Aşiretler Zamanı' [Ottoman Modernization/Centralization and Crisis: The Times of Tribes in Mardin and around it], *Kadim Akademi SBD*, 3:2 (2019), p.6.
45. Özcoşar, 'Osmanlı Modernleşmesi/Merkezileşmesi ve Kriz', p.7.
46. *Ibid.*, p.16.
47. *Ibid.*, pp.19, 20.
48. *Ibid.*, p.16.
49. *Ibid.*, p.17. See the works of Albert Hourani on the activities of the Bedouin Tribes, Albert Hourani, *A history of the Arab peoples* (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1991); Albert Hourani, *The Emergence of the Modern Middle East* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981).
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61. *Ibid.*, p.105. Lewis, *Nomads and settlers*, pp.100, 101.
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63. Karen Barkey, *Bandits and Bureaucrats: The Ottoman Route to State Centralization* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), p.3.
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72. Cuthell Jr, 'The Muhacirin Komisyonu', pp.184, 185.
73. *Ibid.*, pp.184, 185.
74. BOA, DH_MKT__00041_00036_002_002, Date 27 April 1309 (9 May 1893), BOA, DH_MKT__00041_00036_001_001, Date 22 April 1309 (4 May 1893).
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