Browsing by Author "Dalar, Ibrahim"

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Is the Priority of the Other I over the I in Nermi Uygur's Phenomenology an Attempt to Scour Husserl's Transcendental Egology
(Beytulhikme Felsefe Cevresi, 2025) Dalar, Ibrahim
Nermi Uygur, in Edmund Husserl'de Ba & scedil;kas & imath;n & imath;n Beni Problemi, adopts a "construct through destruction" approach to address challenges in Husserl's transcendental phenomenology. This article examines Uygur's approach in two sections. The first critiques Uygur's conclusion that Husserl's transcendental idealism is metaphysical idealism, arguing instead that it is metaphysically neutral and essential to phenomenology. Uygur's imposition of metaphysical idealism on Husserl's intersubjectivity prioritizes the Other I but disrupts Husserl's constitution of the Other I through the transcendental I, reducing it to mundane intersubjectivity and scouring Husserl's egological transcendental intersubjectivity. The second section examines this in three parts: it argues that the subjectivity of the I is fundamental to transcendental experience, questions whether Uygur's Du-Evidenz substitutes or supplements Husserl's empathy, and critiques Uygur for conflating the 'personal I' and the 'transcendental I.' Uygur, in divorcing transcendental intersubjectivity from solipsism, seemingly makes a mundane leap, prioritizing the 'personal Other I' over the 'personal I'.
Transandantal Ego Egoizme Karşı: Jesse Prinz’in Empati Yorumuna Fenomenolojik Bir İtiraz
(Beytulhikme Felsefe Cevresi, 2025) Dalar, Ibrahim
This article will first reconstruct how Husserl's exploration of the transcendental intersubjectivity, starting with transcendental ego, effectively resolves the enigma of solipsism. It will also establish that transcendental ego, as uncovered by Husserl through Cartesian way, does not embody the self-contained solipsism of a Cartesian ego. Secondly, we will give an examination of transcendental intersubjectivity, which is grounded and deepened through Husserl's theory of empathy. While Husserl did not specifically formulate a phenomenology of ethics centred on empathy, his analyses on the concept of empathy hold great promise. As Husserl's transcendental intersubjectivity analyses progress via empathy, empathy will soundly proceed through a non-egoistic framework, and it may motivate moral action. Finally, the transcendental foundations of empathy will be used to refute Jesse Prinz's claims that empathy is unnecessary for moral judgement and interferes with it. Our answer will highlight the complexity and variability of empathic responses, and this will imply that empathy can indeed motivate moral actions and moral judgements.