Transandantal Ego Egoizme Karşı: Jesse Prinz’in Empati Yorumuna Fenomenolojik Bir İtiraz

Abstract

This article will first reconstruct how Husserl's exploration of the transcendental intersubjectivity, starting with transcendental ego, effectively resolves the enigma of solipsism. It will also establish that transcendental ego, as uncovered by Husserl through Cartesian way, does not embody the self-contained solipsism of a Cartesian ego. Secondly, we will give an examination of transcendental intersubjectivity, which is grounded and deepened through Husserl's theory of empathy. While Husserl did not specifically formulate a phenomenology of ethics centred on empathy, his analyses on the concept of empathy hold great promise. As Husserl's transcendental intersubjectivity analyses progress via empathy, empathy will soundly proceed through a non-egoistic framework, and it may motivate moral action. Finally, the transcendental foundations of empathy will be used to refute Jesse Prinz's claims that empathy is unnecessary for moral judgement and interferes with it. Our answer will highlight the complexity and variability of empathic responses, and this will imply that empathy can indeed motivate moral actions and moral judgements.