Forgetfulness and world in husserl and heidegger

Abstract

This dissertation deals with the ways in which Husserl and Heidegger constitute the relationship between forgetfulness and world. I will examine the Cartesian view of the world as a ground to analyse the structure of forgetfulness in both. Therefore, I will respectively expound their accounts, and focus on how they break with the Cartesian tradition and overcome forgetfulness. I will contest Heidegger's claim that Husserl remains in the grip of Cartesian assumptions of the world, and argue that it is Heidegger himself who remains loyal to the Cartesian enterprise through forgetting the embodiment of Dasein and the sensuous material world. My study concludes that Husserl's coherent and distinctive phenomenological analyses on consciousness, subjectivity, lifeworld, embodiment, spatiality, and intersubjectivity can overcome the forgetfulness of the lifeworld, which is inherited from Descartes