The Emergence of the Distinction between Complete and Incomplete Causes from Avicenna to al-Abhari

Abstract

In this study, I explore the historical stages of the development of the distinction between complete and incomplete causes (al-'illa al-tamma and al-'illa al-naqisa), which first emerged during the thirteenth century and was frequently in use thereafter in philosophical and theological writings. For this purpose, I trace the evolution of one such passage in Avicenna's (d. 428/1037) Isharat, namely, III.V.8, in the context of causal sufficiency during post-classical Islamic thought. Abu al-Barakat al-Baghdadi (d. 547/1152), Suhrawardi (d. 587/1191), and Fakhr al-Din al-Razi (d. 606/1210), all of whom provided the first examples of a concept of a complete cause, offer an important notion of this distinction. Moreover, we can read al-Razi's definition of a complete cause in his al-Matalib, with regard to its function, as an attempt to include the divine will in the causal processes. However, none of those definitions present a clear distinction between these two types of causes that would enable one to provide a clear definition for a complete cause. The first examples of a clear distinction between these two causes are provided by Athir al-Din al-Abhari (d. 663/1265) and Najm al-Din al-Katibi (d. 675/1277). This distinction occupied an essential place in the chapters of causality included within philosophical and theological texts written after the thirteenth century.