Is the Priority of the Other I over the I in Nermi Uygur's Phenomenology an Attempt to Scour Husserl's Transcendental Egology

Abstract

Nermi Uygur, in Edmund Husserl'de Ba & scedil;kas & imath;n & imath;n Beni Problemi, adopts a "construct through destruction" approach to address challenges in Husserl's transcendental phenomenology. This article examines Uygur's approach in two sections. The first critiques Uygur's conclusion that Husserl's transcendental idealism is metaphysical idealism, arguing instead that it is metaphysically neutral and essential to phenomenology. Uygur's imposition of metaphysical idealism on Husserl's intersubjectivity prioritizes the Other I but disrupts Husserl's constitution of the Other I through the transcendental I, reducing it to mundane intersubjectivity and scouring Husserl's egological transcendental intersubjectivity. The second section examines this in three parts: it argues that the subjectivity of the I is fundamental to transcendental experience, questions whether Uygur's Du-Evidenz substitutes or supplements Husserl's empathy, and critiques Uygur for conflating the 'personal I' and the 'transcendental I.' Uygur, in divorcing transcendental intersubjectivity from solipsism, seemingly makes a mundane leap, prioritizing the 'personal Other I' over the 'personal I'.