The Transformation of The Idea of Substance From Aristotelian Classical Logic To Fregean Modern Logic

Abstract

Aristotelian classical logic, based on the idea of substance, claims that existence is based on the knowledge of concrete individual existence. For this reason, the objects named by names have a relation to existence itself. With Kant's transcendental thought, it is seen that an understanding of the object compatible with our knowledge replaces the Aristotelian idea of substance. With Fregean modern logic, this discussion has turned into talking about the logical object based on the logical form of language. This study seeks to answer the question of how the relationship between the idea of substance, which we encounter in Aristotelian classical logic, and existence in terms of logical objects is transformed in Fregean modern logic. Methodologically, the fundamental difference between Aristotelian classical logic and Fregean modern logic is analyzed in terms of the category of substance. According to Frege, the logic of language has an analytic a priori structure that enables arithmetic to be reduced to logic. As a result, in Fregean modern logic, according to the function and argument-based structure of language, it is possible to explain the truth value obtained by the proposition as a logical object.